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CHAPTER I  
 
 
 
PAYDAY LOAN AND PAWNSHOP USAGE: THE IMPACT OF ALLOWING 
PAYDAY LOAN ROLLOVERS  
 
 
 
I.1 Introduction 
   “WARNING: A small loan is not intended to meet long term financial needs. A 
small loan should be used only to meet short term cash needs.”1 Despite regulators 
forcing payday lenders to post this announcement, borrowers often do not heed the 
warning and extend their payday loans for months by paying the interest on the loan and 
prolonging repayment until the next period -- a process called “rolling over.”  The 
practice of rolling over payday loans is popular, and 25 states have now prohibited 
rollovers on payday loans.2   
Unlike credit from banks and payday lenders, pawnshop loans do not depend on 
credit scores and are available to anyone.  Since payday borrowers often have low credit 
scores and are credit constrained, pawnshops may be one of the only options low-income 
borrowers have available after exhausting payday loan options.3,4  This paper provides an 
                                                
1 Indiana state law, IN ST 24-4.5-7-101, Ch. 7 “Small Loans”, requires this warning. 
2 Over 50 percent of respondents in a national payday loan sample renewed payday loans three or 
more times (Lawrence and Elliehausen, 2008).  
3 Logan and Weller (2009) find that one-third of payday borrowers have been denied credit 
during the past five years.  Carter, Skiba, and Tobacman (2011) show that payday borrowers are 
liquidity constrained relative to non-payday borrowers at a credit union in the western United 
States. Individuals at the credit union who did not take out payday loans had an average of $6,529 
available liquidity in their checking, savings, and line of credit accounts. Individuals who used a 
payday loan during a given six-month period only had an average of $832 available.  
Additionally, 70.1 percent of the payday borrowers in the sample had no available line of credit 
when they took out a payday loan.  Dobbie and Skiba (2011) find that payday borrowers take out 
loans that are at least 45 cents larger for each additional dollar available in credit, providing 
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empirical investigation of the effect of state legislation allowing payday loan rollovers on 
the use of both payday loans and pawnshops.  I find that borrowers who can roll over 
payday loans three or more times are more likely to use pawnshops and payday loans 
together.  Instead of the two forms of credit being substitutes, as we might expect, 
pawnshops are complements to rolling over loans.  The ability to roll over payday loans 
may encourage borrowers to use a pawnshop loan to pay the interest on the payday loan 
and roll it over, rather than taking out a new payday loan or defaulting.      
In the appendix, I use transaction data from a payday and pawnshop lender to 
show that relative to the full sample of payday borrowers, individuals who took out a 
pawnshop loan within one day of a payday loan due date were more likely to renew a 
payday loan (56 percent relative to 51 percent) and less likely to pay off a payday loan 
(35 percent relative to 40 percent).      
Compared to traditional bank loans, credit unions, and credit card providers, both 
payday loans and pawnshops have high interest rates, with some charging up to 25 
percent per loan (equivalent to an APR of 650 percent if the interest was rolled over 
every two weeks (25 percent x 26)).  If a borrower who is paid bi-weekly rolls over a 
$300 payday loan at an interest rate of 15 percent for three months, the borrower pays 
$270 in interest on that loan.  On average, individuals in Skiba and Tobacman's (2008) 
sample of Texas payday borrowers defaulted after paying almost 90 percent of their loan 
in interest payments.  
To study the effect of allowing borrowers to roll over loans, I use new, national-
level survey data collected by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as a 
                                                                                                                                            
evidence that payday borrowers are liquidity constrained.  If they were not, an increase in 
available credit would not affect the size of the payday loan. 
4 Consumers also may turn to friends and family but there is minimal data on this form of credit.  
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supplement to the January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS).  The new supplement 
asks questions on the use of payday loans and pawnshops and provides the first 
opportunity for researchers to study the use of multiple alternative financial services at a 
national level.  Since the survey is coupled with the detailed information provided in the 
CPS, I can control for demographic characteristics that may affect demand.  According to 
the data, 3.4 percent of households in the United States use payday loans and 2 percent 
use pawnshops.5  Conditional on using a payday loan, there is a 13.8 percent chance an 
individual uses a pawnshop loan.         
The results of the paper reveal that the relative risk of using both pawnshops and 
payday loans compared to neither service would increase by a factor of 1.67 for 
individuals living in states that allow at least three rollovers relative to states that prohibit 
rollovers.  In other words, individuals are more likely to use both payday loans and 
pawnshops together in states that allow at least three rollovers.  This finding provides 
evidence that laws regarding rollovers do influence the use of pawnshop loans along with 
payday loans.6   
To better understand these findings, the chapter studies the locations of 
pawnshops.  I use information on pawnshop addresses in over 4,000 zip codes in thirteen 
states where payday loans are illegal to study the location of pawnshops within a state.  I 
find that there are more pawnshops located along the border where borrowers can easily 
cross the state line and secure a payday loan that allows rollovers.  Under the reasonable 
assumption that the cost of supplying pawnbroking services is not affected by the 
                                                
5 In 2007, the Survey of Consumer Finance began asking about the use of payday loans.  2.38 
percent of households had used them in the past year.  
6 The average monthly interest rate on a pawnshop loan in a state where payday loan rollovers are 
not allowed is greater than the average monthly interest rate in a state where rollovers allowed by 
only 0.1 percent. 
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proximity to a state that allows rollovers (after controlling for zip-code-level 
characteristics), these results suggest that the availability of payday loans that can be 
rolled over increases the probability of someone using a pawn loan.      
Finally, I turn to a discussion of the utility impact of using pawnshops to roll over 
payday loans compared to using other payday lenders to repay their loan or defaulting, 
two alternative options when rollovers are not allowed.  Using pawnshop loans is not 
necessarily more utility diminishing than the other options.  
To my knowledge, this paper is the first to study the effect of renewal laws on the 
use of pawnshops together with payday loans.  Understanding the services people use 
together and independently is important for giving a better understanding of the financial 
picture of individuals.  Studies focusing on the reasons for using a particular service are 
important for determining the impacts of various regulations; however, the external 
impacts are important as well.  For example, if payday loans are prohibited where else are 
borrowers turning?  If borrowers are less constrained in terms of taking out payday loans 
(allowing more rollovers), does it have a positive or negative impact on substitutes? It 
remains to be studied empirically whether rolling over loans has a positive or negative 
effect on utility in general, but this paper studies the first order impact of rollovers on the 
use of the two services.   
 
I.2 Background on Payday Loans and Pawnshops 
    To secure a pawnshop loan, a borrower leaves a material possession at the 
pawnshop in exchange for cash. If the loan is not repaid, the object is forfeited. 
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Borrowers need neither a bank account nor a job to secure one of these loans. 7  
Pawnshops are regulated at the state (and sometimes local) level, with limits on the 
length of the loan, the amount that can be charged for interest, and shop locations.        
Meanwhile, to obtain a payday loan, a borrower writes a post-dated check in the 
amount of the loan plus interest due on the borrower's next payday. On the next payday, a 
borrower may choose to repay the loan, renew the loan by paying the interest again, or 
default. While most states do not allow payday loans to be renewed, thirteen states allow 
up to six renewals or do not regulate renewals at all.  Research on whether payday loans 
are harmful or beneficial to borrowers is mixed and, at present, no definitive conclusion 
has been reached.8   
There is surprisingly little economic research on pawnshops, despite having acted 
as an important source of credit for low-income borrowers for centuries.  An exception is 
John Caskey's book Fringe Banking: Check-Cashing Outlets, Pawnshops, and the Poor, 
published in 1994, bringing attention to the understudied markets of pawnshops.  The 
exact time and place where pawnshops began is uncertain, but there are biblical 
references to them in the Old Testament (Caskey, 1994 from Levine, 1991).  The symbol 
of pawnshops (three gold circles) that continues to hang on most pawnshop storefronts 
today has its roots in the coat of arms of the Lombards, who first began pawning items in 
Britain (Caskey, 1994). In the United States, pawnbroking began in the 17th century.  By 
                                                
7 Johnson and Johnson (1998), however, report in their survey that 47.4 percent of their sample of 
active pawnshop borrowers had a checking account and 49.1 percent had a savings account.  Only 
36.4 percent had neither a checking nor a savings account.  
8 When payday loans are eliminated, the number of bounced checks increases and Chapter 7 
bankruptcy filings rise (Morgan and Strain, 2008; Zinman, 2010).  Additionally, with the 
availability of payday loans, individuals are better able to cope with income shocks caused by 
natural disasters (Morse, 2011).  On the other hand, it has also been shown that access to payday 
loans may increase financial hardships, especially difficulty paying bills, the need to postpone 
medical care (Melzer, 2011), and filing for Chapter 13 bankruptcy (Skiba and Tobacman, 2011). 
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the 19th century, there were a number of philanthropic pawnshops.9  Pawnshop 
popularity diminished in the early 2000s; however, recent industry reports have revealed 
that pawnshop demand has increased since the latest economic crisis (Haspel, 2011).  
Today there are approximately 12,000 publicly and privately held pawnshops across the 
United States.10  
 Payday loans began to gain popularity in the mid 1990s and into the early 2000s.  
Caskey (2005) argues that the rise in payday lending helped lead to a decline of 
pawnshops.  Many individuals who visited pawnshops had bank accounts and jobs, and 
therefore were eligible for payday loans.  Additionally, large pawnshops began to offer 
payday loans as well (Caskey, 2005).  By 2009, more than 10 million households used 
payday loans (Skiba and Tobacman, 2009).  More recently, payday loans have spread to 
traditional banks as well.  Some banks, including U.S. Bancorp, Regions, and Fifth Third 
Bank, have begun to offer direct-deposit advances which are similar to payday loans 
(Randall and Zibel, 2011; Allyn, 2011).       
To study the policy implications of changing the number of rollovers allowed, Li, 
Mumford, and Tobias (2011) use online payday loan data to simulate the effect of 
changing state laws from allowing unlimited rollovers to allowing no rollovers.  They 
estimate that this change would have no impact on the size of the loan taken out, would 
decrease the number of days for which the loan was held, and would decrease the 
probability of default.      
Avery and Samolyk (2011) have the first paper (that I have seen) to use the FDIC 
supplement used in this paper to study both payday and pawnshop loans. They look at the 
                                                
9 Vanderbilt University's namesake, Cornelius Vanderbilt, helped to found one of the most 
prominent philanthropic pawnshops, the Provident Loan Society (Caskey, 1994).  
10 http://www.uspawnshopdirectory.com/maillist.php  
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use of payday loans and pawnshops and measure the relationship between interest rate 
ceilings and the use of these two forms of credit as well as the number of storefronts.  
Their results do not show a large effect of interest ceilings on the use of payday loans; 
meanwhile, there is a positive relationship between the number of stores in operation and 
interest ceilings.  These results suggest that lowering interest rates will cause payday 
lenders to adjust their operations, but it will allow borrowers to continue to take out loans 
at a lower cost.   
 
I.3 Data 
    I use national survey data and pawnshop location data to explore whether state 
variation in payday loan laws affects the use of payday loans and pawnshops.  In January 
of 2009, the FDIC added a questionnaire to the Current Population Survey (CPS) to gain 
more information on the populations of individuals that do not have bank accounts and 
that use non-bank financial services. The survey asked questions on whether individuals 
had a bank account.11 Additionally, it asked specific questions on the use of alternative 
financial services: payday loans, check cashing, pawnshops, rent-to-own usage, tax-
refund anticipation loans, and non-bank money orders. For each of these services, the 
survey asked about the frequency of use and the reasons for using the service.  This data 
gives us a better understanding of what combinations of services people are using.      
For someone to be considered a pawnshop user in my analysis, they must answer 
“yes” to the question “Have you or anyone in your household ever sold items at a pawn 
                                                
11 Approximately 7.7 percent of households were without bank accounts, and another 17.9 
percent had bank accounts but also used alternative forms of finance (FDIC, 2009).  A full 
summary of the findings as well as state averages can be found in the “Executive Summary” 
(FDIC, 2009) and the “Addendum” (FDIC, 2010).  
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shop?” and have a frequency of use of either “At least a few times a year” or “Once or 
twice a year.” Meanwhile, an individual is coded as using payday loans if they answer 
“yes” to the question “Have you or anyone in your household ever used payday loan or 
payday advance services?” and they say that they have taken out at least one payday loan 
in the past twelve months.      
Table I-1 presents summary statistics on the use of payday and pawnshop loans. 
More individuals use payday loans than pawnshops, and only a small fraction use them 
together.  Individuals with lower income or education and minorities are more likely to 
use these services both individually and together.   For example, 7.47 percent of 
American Indians use payday loans, 3.70 use pawnshops, and 2.45 percent use them 
together.   
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Table I-1: The Percentage of People who Use Payday Loans, Pawnshops, and Both 
Payday Loans and Pawnshops 
 
 
 
 
Table I-2 shows the reasons people give for using these two forms of credit. 
Pawnshop loan users in states where payday loans are illegal respond that they use 
pawnshops because of lack of alternative options (the reasons for which include both the 
fact that banks do not have small loans and the fact that they do not qualify).  In states 
where payday loans are legal, payday borrowers are more likely to say that convenience 
and ease are reasons for using pawnshops.     
Payday Loan Pawn Loan PDL & Pawn
All 3.44% 1.96% 0.46%
Age over 25 3.28% 1.80% 0.43%
Age Less than 25 4.48% 3.03% 0.66%
Don't Own Home 6.47% 3.89% 0.89%
Own Home 2.22% 1.20% 0.29%
No Response 3.87% 1.77% 0.52%
Income greater than $30,000 2.91% 1.34% 0.33%
Income less than $30,000 5.24% 4.07% 0.92%
Payday Lending Illegal 1.16% 1.37% 0.11%
Payday Lending Legal 4.26% 2.18% 0.59%
Less than HS 4.19% 3.47% 0.69%
HS Grad Max 4.21% 2.37% 0.58%
Some College 4.24% 1.99% 0.56%
College Plus 1.47% 0.78% 0.13%
American Indian only 7.47% 8.51% 2.45%
Asian Only 1.20% 0.44% 0.05%
Black 7.47% 3.70% 1.02%
Hispanic 3.84% 2.81% 0.53%
Mixed Race 5.41% 3.07% 0.25%
White Only 2.78% 1.55% 0.37%
Ever Been on Active Duty 3.24% 1.75% 0.47%
Source: Author's Calculations from January 2009 Current Population Survey
NOTES: Table I-1 shows the percentage of people in each group that use payday loans,  pawn 
loans, and payday loans and pawn loans jointy, by group.  Percentages are weighted to 
represent a national sample.
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Table I-2: The Reasons for Using Payday Loans and Pawnshops 
 
 
 
In addition to using the CPS information to study what factors affect the 
probability that individuals will use payday loans and pawnshops, I look at the location 
decisions of pawnshops in states where payday loans are illegal.  I obtain pawnshop 
locations through an online provider of pawnshop addresses.12   Zip codes were coded 
based on their proximity to the border of states using the mapping software ArcGIS. To 
control for income within zip codes, I use data from the 2000 Census. 
 
                                                
12 http://www.pawnshoplistings.com/ 
Convenient Ease Comfort Not Qualify Other
Don't Know /              
No Response 
/ Refuse to 
Answer
States where Payday are Not 
Legal 27.70% 41.49% 3.09% 15.56% 11.59% 0.57%
States where Payday are 
Legal 25.75% 43.98% 2.46% 16.92% 9.77% 1.13%
Banks No 
Small 
Loans Convenient Ease Comfort Not Qualify Other
Don't Know /              
No Response 
/ Refuse to 
Answer
States where Payday are Not 
Legal 7.66% 25.46% 40.93% 0.76% 12.63% 12.04% 0.51%
States where Payday are 
Legal 7.47% 21.29% 41.56% 3.38% 12.04% 13.51% 0.74%
States where Payday are Not 
Legal, Payday Loan User 21.91% 15.22% 26.56% 0.00% 36.31% 0.00% 0.00%
States where Payday are 
Legal, Payday Loan User 11.69% 21.98% 40.19% 1.71% 14.64% 9.78% 0.00%
Source: Author's Calculations from January 2009 Current Population Survey
Why Use Payday Loans
Why Use Pawn Loans
NOTES: Table I-2 shows the reasons people give for using payday loans, and pawn loans.  Groups are split by states where 
payday loans are legal and illegal, and by whether people are payday loan users or not.  These results are weighted to 
represent a national sample
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I.4 Identifying the Effect of Allowing Rollovers Using Variation in State Laws 
As presented in Table I-3, the state rules on payday loans and pawnshops vary.  I 
am interested in the effect of state policy variables on the use of payday loans and 
pawnshop loans, focusing on the number of renewals allowed and controlling for interest 
rates.  State regulations on the number of rollovers vary from allowing zero to not 
specifying a limit.  Geographically, states that allow rollovers are scattered across the 
United States, as are states that prohibit rollovers.  Figure I-1 presents a map of the 
contiguous United States indicating states where payday loans are illegal, and for states 
where rollovers are legal, the number of rollovers allowed in each state.    
12 
 
Table I-3: Payday and Pawnshop Laws 
 
Pawn Loans
State Payday Loans 
Legal?
Rates # Renewals Allowed Rates / Month
Alabama Legal 17.50%; 3%/month after default 1 25% / mo
Alaska Legal $5 + the lesser of $15 per $100 or 15% 2 20% / mo
Arizona Legal (Prohibited in 
2010)
15% 3
8% / mo
Arkansas Legal 10% of check + $10; $5 ID card 0 none
California Legal 15% of check 0 2.5% / mo
Colorado Legal 20%: $0-$300 + 7.5%: $301-$500 plus 45% per 
annum interest plus monthly maintenance fee 
$7.50 per $100 borrowed, up to $30, after first 
month.
Not Specified local rules
Connecticut Prohibited 0 3% / mo
DC Prohibited 0 5% / mo
Delaware Legal Not Specified 4 3% / mo
Florida Legal 10% + verification fee 0 25% / mo
Georgia Prohibited 0 25% / mo
Hawaii Legal 15% of check 0 20% / mo
Idaho Legal Not Specified 3 none
Illinois Legal $15.50 per $100 0 3% / mo
Indiana Legal 15%: $0-$250; 13%: $251-$400; 10%: $401-
$500
0 3% / mo
Iowa Legal $15: $0-$100; $10 per $100 thereafter 0 none
Kansas Legal 15% Not Specified 10% / mo
Kentucky Legal $15 per $100 + $1 database fee 0 2% / mo
Louisiana Legal $5 documentation fee + the greater of 16.75% of 
check or $45 (After default: months 1-12: 36% 
per year; months 13 and beyond: 18% per year)
0 10% / mo
Maine Prohibited 0 25% / mo
Maryland Prohibited 0 none
Massachusetts Prohibited 0 3% / mo
Michigan Legal 15% of first $100, 14% of second $100, 13% of 
third $100, 12% of fourth $100, 11% of fifth 
$100, 11% of sixth $100 + any database 
verification fee
0 3% / mo
Minnesota Legal $5.50: $0-$50; 10%+$5: $51-$100; 7% (min. 
$10) + $5: $101-$250; 6% (min. $17.50) + $5: 
$251-$350 (After default: 2.75% per month)
0
3% / mo
Mississippi Legal 18% of check 0 25% / mo
Missouri Legal 75% 6 2% / mo
Montana Legal 25% 0 25% / mo
Nebraska Legal $15 per $100 or pro rata for any part thereof on 
amount of check
0
none
Nevada Legal Not Specified Not Specified 10% / mo
New Hampshire Legal 36% annual interest 0 none
New Jersey Prohibited 0 4% / mo
New Mexico Legal $15.50 per $100; $.50 verification fee per $100 0 max{7.50, 10%}
New York Prohibited 0 4% / mo
North Carolina Prohibited 0 2% / mo
North Dakota Legal 20% + databasing fee 1 regulated by municipalities
Ohio Legal 28% annual interest 0 5% / mo
Oklahoma Legal $15 per $100: $0- $300; $10 per $100: $301-
$500
0
20% / mo
Oregon Legal 36% APR interest, $10/$100 fee up to $30 2 3% / mo
Pennsylvania Prohibited 0 2.5% / mo
Rhode Island Legal 10% 1 5% / mo
South Carolina Legal 15% of principal 0 $22.50/$100 / mo
South Dakota Legal Not Specified 4 none
Tennessee Legal the lesser of 15% of the check or $30 0 2% / mo
Texas Legal $10 per loan + 48% annual interest 0 $20 / mo
Utah Legal No usury limit Not Specified 10% / mo
Vermont Prohibited 0 3% / mo
Virginia Legal 36% annual interest + $5 verification fee + 20% 
of loan
0
5% / mo
Washington Legal 15%: first $500; 10%: remaining portion of the 
loan in excess of $500 up to the $700 maximum
0 3% / mo
West Virginia Prohibited 0 none
Wisconsin Legal NO LIMIT 1 3% / mo
Wyoming Legal the greater of 20% or $30 0 20% / mo
Payday Loans
Table I-3 shows the payday loan and pawnshop laws by state as of 2009.  The state laws on payday loans come from 
http://www.paydayloaninfo.org/state-information, and the state laws on pawn shops come from individual state regulating insitutions.
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Figure I-1: Payday Loan Status and Number of Rollovers Allowed in Each State, 2011 
 
 
 
I investigate whether there are endogeniety issues related to the state laws on 
payday loans.  The concern is that the states where payday loan laws on rollovers are 
more lenient are different in other respects than just the law on rollovers that might 
influence the use of payday and pawnshops.  I regress the median income in the state in 
2008, the unemployment rate in 2008, the percent change in unemployment rate from 
Legend
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Legal / 4 or more
Legal / 1-3
Legal / 0
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States
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Legal / 0
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2007 to 2008, and foreclosure rates on the a number of outcomes.13  The first outcome is 
an indicator for the state having a positive number of rollovers followed by the number of 
rollovers, an indicator for three or more rollovers allowed in the state, and an indicator 
for one or two rollovers allowed in the state.  Percent change in unemployment rates and 
foreclosure rates are strongly significant predictors for a state having three or more 
rollovers.  These results might suggest that something other than the number of payday 
loan rollovers allowed affects the use of payday loans and pawnshops.  In the next 
section, I will examine the number of pawnshops in a state without relying on the state 
variation in laws that may have endogenous impacts.  Additionally, I control for 
unemployment, percent change in unemployment, and foreclosure rates in the 
multinomial regressions.   
                                                
13 Foreclosure rates are calculated from http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/map.economy/.  Their 
numbers came from studies done by RealtyTrac.  The unemployment rates come from the U.S. 
Census Bureau.	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Table I-4: State Level Predictors of Rollovers 
 
 
 
 
I measure the factors that affect an individual's decision to use payday loans and 
pawnshops by employing a multinomial logit model and using variation in state laws.   
The multinomial logit is an extension of the binary logit model which enables a test of the 
probability of unordered responses.  The four cases in this multinomial logit are: (1) 
neither payday loans nor pawnshops are used, (2) only payday loans are used, (3) only 
pawnshops are used, and (4) payday loans and pawnshops are both used.      
Median Income 
in 2008
Unemployment 
in 2008
Percent Change 
in 
Unemployment Forclosure Rates
Dependent: Indicatior for Positive Number of Rollovers
Coefficient 0.0000204* -0.0195 0.544 0.375
Standard Error (0.0000113) (0.0618) (0.471) (0.461)
N 37 37 37 37
Dependent: Number of Rollovers
Coefficient 0.0000930* -0.147 0.544 0.375
Standard Error (0.0000490) (0.268) (0.471) (0.461)
N 37 37 37 37
Dependent:  3 or more Rollovers
Coefficient 0.0000117 -0.0477 0.764* 0.753*
Standard Error (0.0000102) (0.0534) (0.399) (0.387)
N 37 37 37 37
Dependent: 1 or 2 rollovers
Coefficient 0.00000874 0.0282 -0.221 -0.378
Standard Error (0.000009) (0.046200) (0.359000) (0.344000)
N 37 37 37 37
Source: Author's Calculations from January 2009 Current Population Survey
NOTES: Table I-4 Reports the coefficients of a regression of median income, 
unemployment, percent change in unemployment, and forclosure rates on the number of 
rollovers allowed in a state.  Only states where payday loans are legal are included.
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State Level Number of Renewals Allowed represents the number of rollovers 
allowed in the state.  For states where the number of rollovers permitted is not specified, I 
set the number of renewals to the maximum allowed in any other state, six.  After running 
the initial regression, I split the number of renewals into two categories: states where one 
or two rollovers are allowed versus states where three or more rollovers are allowed to 
measure whether there is a difference in the effect on the use of payday loans and 
pawnshops depending on how many times an individual can roll over her loan.      
Following Prager (2009), I create the variable Pawn Rate Restriction to represent 
how constrained a pawnshop is when setting the interest rate. The variable equals 0 if the 
state does not regulate pawn interest rates or if the state has an allowable interest rate of 
greater than or equal to 25 percent. If the state has an interest cap of less than 25 percent, 
then the variable is equal to 25 minus the interest rate.14   In terms of consumer demand, 
lower interest rates would entice more individuals to take out pawn loans, unless the 
loan-to-value ratio is also reduced.15   The lower interest rates may have a negative 
supply effect on the number of pawnshops available. The expectation on the sign of this 
variable, therefore, is ambiguous.  The interest rates previously reported in Table I-3 
show the monthly interest rate cap on a pawned item valued at $100.  Interest rates vary 
from two percent to 25 percent, and some states do not regulate interest rates.        
The Payday Rate Restriction variable represents the restrictiveness of state 
regulations on interest rates and is created in the same manner as Pawn Rate Restriction.  
Some states explicitly prohibit payday loans, while others allow interest rates up to 
                                                
14 Shackman and Tenney (2006) instead set 25 percent to be the interest rate charged in states 
where there is no regulation because in practice pawnshops do not charge more than 25 percent in 
interest (which the authors confirmed by using a phone survey). 
15 Johnson and Johnson (1998) go through an exercise illustrating the relationship between 
interest rate and loan-to-value ratio. 
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twenty percent. The payday loan rate in Table I-3 represents the interest rate on a two-
week loan of $100.16   Payday interest rates may have either a positive or negative effect 
on the joint use of payday loans and pawnshop loans.  Higher interest rates are more 
expensive, so individuals may have to supplement their use of payday loans by pawning 
items to either pay back the loan or to supplement their income after paying the higher 
rate.  However, higher interest rates may deter individuals from using payday loans in 
general, so it may decrease joint use.  The average payday loan interest rate for states 
where no renewals are allowed differs from the average interest rate in states where 
renewals are not allowed by only 0.05 percent.  The interest rate for Ohio changed during 
2008 and New Hampshire's interest rate is only 36 percent APR, an interest rate that 
limits payday lenders ability to survive; therefore, I dropped those two states.17  
To capture observed factors that would affect the use of both payday loans and 
pawnshops, I control for a number of demographic characteristics including sex, age, 
marital status, income, the presence of children, and education. I also include a dummy 
for whether someone has been on active duty in the military.18   
                                                
16 If the state-regulated interest rate is given in terms of an APR, I calculate it to be (APR/365)*14 
to put it in term of two week loans.  
17 In unreported regressions, I used the payday loan interest rate categories used in Avery and 
Samolyk (2011).  The results on the number of renewals remains unchanged.  
18 The “John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007” (H.R.5122) made 
it illegal a lender for providing a loan of greater than 36 percent APR to any military personnel, 
effectively prohibiting payday lenders from providing loans to military personnel because of the 
concern that payday lenders were targeting people in the military (“Military Payday Loans,” 
2009). Graves and Peterson (2005) study the location decisions of payday lenders in relation to 
military bases, and find that there is large concentration of payday lenders near military bases. 
Carrell and Zinman (2008) investigate the impact of payday loans on military personnel and find 
that the presence of payday loans in states where an airman is assigned increases the likelihood of 
being ineligible for reinlistment and unfavorable reports, especially for the young and financially 
unsophisticated (proxied for by job assignment), which provides support for the Pentagon's 
concern that payday loans cause financial distress for military personnel. 
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To control for location, I include a dummy for Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(MSA) size and variables on state unemployment rates in 2008 and the change in 
unemployment rates between 2007 and 2008.  I cluster standard errors at the state level.  
Further descriptions of the control variables can be found in Table I-5.   
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Table I-5: Definition of Variables 
 
 
 
 
I.4.1 Results 
    Results of the multinomial regression are reported in Table I-6.  The relative 
risk ratio reported shows the average times more likely someone is to use just a payday 
loan, just a pawnshop loan, or both.  The relative risk ratio reports the ratio of the 
Variable Definition of Variable
Payday Loan An individual is coded as using payday loans if they answer yes to the question "Have you or anyone 
in your household ever used payday loan or payday advance services?" and they say that they have 
taken out at least one payday loan in the past 12 months.  
Pawn Rate Restriction The variable equals 0 if the state does not regulate pawnshop interest rates or if the state has an 
interest rate allowable of greater than 25%.  If the state has an interest cap of less than 25%, then the 
ceiling is 25 minus the interest rate.  
Payday Rate RestrictionThe variable equals 0 if the state does not regulate payday loan interest rates or if the state has an 
interest rate allowable of greater than 25%.  If the state has an interest cap of less than 25%, then the 
ceiling is 25 minus the interest rate.  
Military An indicator variable if an individual has ever served on active duty in the military, otherwise 0.
Female An indicator variable equal to 1 if the individual is Female, otherwise 0.
Age A discrete variable for the individuals age.  A quadratic form of age is included in the regression.
Not-Citizen An indicator equal to 1 if an individual reports to not being a citizen, 0 otherwise.
Married An indicator equal to 1 if an individual is married, 0 otherwise.
Employed An indicator equal to 1 if an individual reports to being employed, O otherwise.
One Child An indicator equal to 1 if an individual has one child, and zero otherwise, O otherwise.
More than One Child An indicator equal to 1 if an individual has more than one child, 0 otherwise.
HS Grad Max An indicator equalt to 1 if an individual graduated from college, 0 otherwise.
Some College An indicator equal to 1 if an individual had some college experience but did not graduate from 
college, 0 otherwise.
College Plus An indicator equal to 1 if an individual graduated to colllege and may have had some graduate 
schooling, 0 otherwise.
Unbanked An indicator equal to 1 if an individual reports to not have a checking or savings account, 0 otherwise.
Black An indicator equal to 1 if the individual's race is black, 0 otherwise.
Hispanic An indicator equal to 1 if the individual is of Hispanic Origin, 0 otherwise.
NOTES: Table I-5 reports definitions for variables used in the later regressions.  The  variables come from the January 2009 
CPS.  
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probability that a borrower takes out the loan or loans over the probability of taking out 
neither in a state that allows rollovers relative to a state that does not.  The relative risk 
ratio on the State Level Number of Renewals Allowed variable is greater than one, 
revealing that the greater the number of renewals allowed in a state, the greater the 
likelihood that people will use only payday loans relative to using neither, although the 
result is not statistically significant. More renewals allowed reduces the likelihood an 
individual uses just pawnshops at a statistically insignificant level.  Most importantly for 
this paper, the coefficient is greater than one and significant for the use of both payday 
loans and pawnshops together.   Allowing more rollovers increases the likelihood of 
using both payday loans and pawnshops by an average of 1.08.   
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Table I-6: Multinomial Regression, Relative Risk Ratios 
 
 
 
I then break the states into three categories: states that prohibit rollovers, states 
that allow one or two rollovers, and states that allow at least three rollovers.  The results 
in Table I-7 show that individuals in states that allow only one or two rollovers have a 
lower probability of using both payday loans and pawnshops (relative risk ratio less than 
one); however, this result is not statistically significant.  In states that allow three or more 
rollovers, individuals are 1.67 times more likely to use both payday loans and pawnshops.    
(1) (2) (3)
status: Payday Loan = 1 status: Pawnshop Loan = 1 status: Pawnshop & Payday Loan = 1
Pawn Ceiling 1.011 0.981 *** 0.993
(0.102) (0.005) (0.638)
Payday Loan Ceiling 1.016 1.045 ** 1.034
(0.358) (0.038) (0.206)
State Level Number of Renewals Allowed 1.054 0.952 1.080 **
(0.116) (0.205) (0.019)
Unbanked 0.861 2.393 *** 1.990 ***
(0.238) (0.000) (0.001)
Employed 0.900 * 0.754 *** 0.914
(0.064) (0.001) (0.658)
Own Home 0.428 *** 0.522 *** 0.668 **
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014)
Female 1.004 1.163 ** 1.051
(0.939) (0.032) (0.647)
Not Citizen 0.568 *** 0.566 0.244 **
(0.000) (0.164) (0.017)
Married 0.791 ** 0.739 *** 0.841
(0.035) (0.002) (0.197)
One Child 1.330 ** 1.182 1.129
(0.020) (0.364) (0.560)
More than One Child 1.398 *** 1.254 1.167
(0.001) (0.123) (0.434)
HS Grad Max 1.069 0.887 0.820
(0.507) (0.429) (0.251)
Some College 0.994 0.784 ** 0.779
(0.949) (0.038) (0.241)
College Plus 0.487 *** 0.569 ** 0.246 ***
(0.000) (0.018) (0.001)
Black 2.362 *** 1.103 2.007 ***
(0.000) (0.580) (0.006)
American Indian 2.427 ** 2.429 * 1.347
(0.012) (0.053) (0.669)
Asian 0.583 *** 0.605 0.243 *
(0.007) (0.210) (0.063)
Hispanic 1.047 1.013 1.044
(0.737) (0.920) (0.875)
Income Quartile 2 1.231 * 0.843 1.161
(0.069) (0.345) (0.283)
Income Quartile 3 0.960 0.454 *** 0.656
(0.777) (0.000) (0.119)
Income Quartile 4 0.541 *** 0.250 *** 0.079 ***
(0.005) (0.000) (0.000)
Custer at the State Level Yes
Number of Observations 48,413
Pseudo R Squared 0.1072
Source: Author's calculations from January 2009 Current Population Survey
NOTES: Table I-6 reports results the relative risk ratios from a multinomial logit regression in states where payday loans are legal.  The base category is someone 
who does not take out a payday loan or a pawnshop loan in the past year.***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.     P-values 
are given in parentheses. Additional controls included but not reported are age, age2, age3, and age4, dummies for MSA size, state unemployment rate in 2008, the 
change in state unemployment rate between 2007 and 2008, and the average foreclosure rates in 2008.  Regressions are weighted to represent a national sample. 
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Table I-7: Multinomial Regression 2, Relative Risk Ratios 
 
(1) (2) (3)
status: Payday Loan = 1
status: Pawnshop 
Loan = 1
status: Pawnshop & 
Payday Loan = 1
Pawn Ceiling 1.012 ** 0.982 ** 0.994
(0.038) (0.010) (0.658)
Payday Loan Ceiling 1.022 1.039 * 1.037
(0.169) (0.096) (0.163)
One or Two Payday Loan 
Rollovers Allowed 0.729 0.738 0.531
(0.224) (0.340) (0.171)
Three ore more Payday Loan 
Rollovers Allowed 1.520 *** 0.660 * 1.674 ***
(0.007) (0.064) (0.007)
Unbanked 0.856 2.405 *** 1.980 ***
(0.208) (0.000) (0.001)
Employed 0.900 0.754 *** 0.912
(0.062) (0.001) (0.650)
Own Home 0.425 *** 0.521 *** 0.659 **
(0.000) (0.000) (0.011)
Female 1.002 1.164 ** 1.050
(0.962) (0.032) (0.656)
Not Citizen 0.576 *** 0.564 0.249 **
(0.000) (0.161) (0.018)
Married 0.789 ** 0.740 *** 0.838
(0.033) (0.002) (0.189)
One Child 1.327 ** 1.180 1.121
(0.021) (0.370) (0.583)
More than One Child 1.393 *** 1.253 1.162
(0.001) (0.125) (0.448)
HS Grad Max 1.068 0.888 0.819
(0.513) (0.432) (0.250)
Some College 0.993 0.786 ** 0.779
(0.944) (0.040) (0.239)
College Plus 0.485 *** 0.570 ** 0.244 ***
(0.000) (0.018) (0.001)
Black 2.370 *** 1.092 2.010 ***
(0.000) (0.618) (0.006)
American Indian 2.451 ** 2.545 ** 1.342
(0.014) (0.038) (0.684)
Asian 0.588 ** 0.599 0.244 *
(0.011) (0.203) (0.062)
Hispanic 1.041 1.018 1.033
(0.761) (0.888) (0.906)
Income Quartile 2 1.232 * 0.843 1.164
(0.069) (0.348) (0.274)
Income Quartile 3 0.969 0.455 *** 0.665
(0.829) (0.000) (0.132)
Income Quartile 4 0.546 *** 0.250 *** 0.080 ***
(0.006) (0.000) (0.000)
Custer at the State Level Yes
Number of Observations 48,413
Pseudo R Squared 0.1088
Source: Author's Calculations from January 2009 Current Population Survey
NOTES: Table I-7 reports results from a multinomial logit regression in states where payday loans are legal.  The base 
category is someone who does not take out a payday loan or a pawnshop loan in the past year.***, **, * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.     P-values are given in parentheses. Additional controls 
included but not reported are age, age2, age3, and age4, dummies for income quartiles, dummies for MSA size, state 
unemployment rate in 2008, and the change in state unemployment rate between 2007 and 2008.   Odds ratios are 
reported in Table I-9.  Regressions are weighted to represent a national sample. 
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In states where pawnshop interest rates are more heavily regulated, payday loans 
are used more often.  More stringent regulation, however, reduces both the use of 
pawnshops and combined payday loan and pawnshop use.  This result is not surprising 
given that Shackman and Tenney (2006) find that interest-rate ceilings reduce the number 
of pawnshops, the number of small loans made, and the loan-to-value ratios of the 
pawnshop loans.  Payday loan interest rate regulations have a positive effect on the 
probability that an individual uses a payday loan, and an insignificant effect on the use of 
pawnshops and joint use.      
Being unbanked reduces the probability an individual uses a payday loan, 
increases the probability an individual uses a pawnshop, and increases the probability that 
the two services are used jointly.  Similarly, being employed does not significantly 
increase the probability of using a payday loan or using both a payday loan and 
pawnshop, which is surprising because payday borrowers are required to have proof of 
employment.  The question in the CPS on bank status and employment does not ask 
whether the payday loan was taken out at the time that an individual was unbanked or 
employed.  Therefore, an individual may have used a payday loan in the months before 
the survey and then be unbanked or unemployed when the survey occurs.  The 
coefficients from the remaining control variables are as expected.    
Table I-8 breaks down these results based on different demographic categories: 
women, men, individuals with income below average, whites, blacks, and Hispanics.  As 
the results show, the relative risk ratio is greater than one for using both payday loans and 
pawnshops in states that allow at least three rollovers and is statistically significant for all 
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categories. In the Hispanic population, borrowers are nine times more likely to use both 
payday loans and pawnshops. 19 
 
Table I-8: Relative Risk Ratio of Using Payday Loans and Pawnshops Relative to States 
that Do Not allow Rollovers by Category 
 
 
                                                
19 Lee and Hanna (2008) find that Hispanics in the U.S. are less likely to report to be delinquent 
on a loan suggesting that this population use credit differently than others in the U.S.   
(1) (2) (3)
status: Payday Loan = 1
status: Pawnshop Loan = 
1
status: Pawnshop & 
Payday Loan = 1
White
1 or 2 Payday Loan Rollovers Allowed 0.601 0.750 0.46
(0.14) (0.41) (0.22)
3 or more rollovers allowed 1.468 0.760 1.62 **
(0.11) (0.24) (0.04)
Black
1 or 2 Payday Loan Rollovers Allowed 0.862 0.404 ** 1.81
(0.77) (0.04) (0.23)
3 or more rollovers allowed 1.523 0.392 ** 3.09 **
(0.20) (0.03) (0.02)
Hispanic
1 or 2 Payday Loan Rollovers Allowed 0.392 1.136 2.61E-14 ***
(0.281) (0.849) (0.000)
3 or more rollovers allowed 3.191 *** 0.410 9.179 **
(0.001) (0.177) (0.026)
Income Below Average
1 or 2 Payday Loan Rollovers Allowed 0.830 0.671 0.65
(0.43) (0.21) (0.35)
3 or more rollovers allowed 1.397 ** 0.719 1.40 *
(0.02) (0.18) (0.17)
Female
1 or 2 Payday Loan Rollovers Allowed 0.688 0.690 0.56
(0.33) (0.27) (0.20)
3 or more rollovers allowed 1.672 ** 0.658 * 1.92 **
(0.01) (0.07) (0.02)
Male
1 or 2 Payday Loan Rollovers Allowed 0.760 0.799 0.46
(0.15) (0.48) (0.11)
3 or more rollovers allowed 1.404 ** 0.651 1.52 **
(0.02) (0.10) (0.02)
Source: Author's Calculations from January 2009 Current Population Survey
NOTES: Table I-8 reports the relative risk ratios from multinomial regressions.  Column (1) is the relative risk ratio of using just 
payday loans.  Column (2) is the relative risk ratio of only pawnshop loans.  Column (3) is the relative risk ratio of using both payday 
loans and pawnshop loans.  The numbers reported are relative risk ratios using of loans for states that allow 1 or 2 or 3 or more 
rollovers relative to states that do not allow any.  Additional controls included but not reported are payday loan and pawnshop loan 
interest rate restrictions, banking status, employment status, home ownership, gender, citizenship, children, education, race, age, age2, 
age3, and age4, dummies for income quartiles, dummies for MSA size, state unemployment rate in 2008, the change in state 
unemployment rate between 2007 and 2008, and average foreclosure rates.   P-values are in parentheses.
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I.5 Cross-Border Effects 
    I have shown that the probability that an individual uses both payday loans and 
pawnshops is greater in states where individuals are legally able to roll over payday 
loans, relative to states where rollovers are not permitted.  In this section, I supplement 
those findings with a study of how pawnshop locations vary within a state depending on 
whether residents have access to payday loans.  State laws on payday loans may be 
endogenous to the use of these services. By looking within states where payday loans are 
illegal, I hope to mitigate the impact of endogenous factors.        
Melzer (2011) shows that there is a significant increase in the number of payday 
loan stores in zip codes that are less than 25 miles from the border of a state where 
payday loans are illegal, signaling that borrowers cross the border to obtain loans. I apply 
this idea to pawnshop locations by examining data from states where payday loans are 
illegal.  Individuals who live in states where paydays loans are illegal may be able to 
easily obtain payday loans by crossing the border into states where they are legal. If the 
payday borrowers who cross the border to obtain loans are also using pawnshops, then 
the number of pawnshops located where the borrowers live may be greater; therefore, I 
would expect there to be more pawnshops located in zip codes that border states where 
payday loan renewals are allowed.        
After controlling for border proximity and zip-code level characteristics, I assume 
that the cost of locating a pawnshop next to a state that allows payday loans with 
rollovers is no different than locating a pawnshop anywhere else in the state.  Therefore, 
any differences I find in the number of shops should be related to differences in demand. 
If there are more pawnshops located along the borders of states where payday loans are 
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legal, this would suggest that the demand for pawnshops is higher when individuals have 
access to payday loans.  More specifically, if I look at the zip codes adjacent to states 
where payday loans are legal and renewals are allowed, then I can determine whether 
there may be an increase in demand for pawnshops in these areas.   
 
I.5.1 Methodology 
    As in Melzer (2011), I define a zip code to be bordering a payday-legal state if 
the center of the zip code is within 25 miles of the border. For example, the state of 
Georgia prohibits payday loans and borders four states where payday loans are legal 
(Alabama, Florida, South Carolina, and Tennessee) and one state where payday loans are 
prohibited (North Carolina). If the center of a zip code located in Georgia is within 25 
miles of Alabama, Florida, South Carolina, or Tennessee, then it is in a Border Legal Zip 
(dummy variable equal to one).  As mentioned previously, Figure I-1 shows a map of the 
contiguous United States, marking states where payday loans are legal and illegal, and 
where they are legal, how many rollovers are allowed.  I am only considering zip codes in 
states where payday loans are illegal and studying within state variation in pawnshop 
locations.        
Zip codes along borders are often located next to rivers, so it is important that I 
control for border states in the regression.  Border signals that the center of the zip code 
is within 25 miles of the border of a state.  Border Legal with Renewals Allowed is a 
dummy variable equal to one if a zip code is bordering a state where payday loans are 
allowed with a positive number of rollovers.  Border Legal with Renewals Prohibited is a 
dummy variable equal to one if a zip code is bordering a state where payday loans are 
27 
 
allowed but rollovers are prohibited.  The omitted category is zip codes bordering states 
where payday loans are illegal.  Border Interest is the interest rate on payday loans across 
the border.        
Zip codes within 25 miles of a state where payday loans are allowed will have 
more pawnshops located in zip codes if individuals use payday loans and pawnshops 
together.  Border Legal with Renewals Allowed will have a positive coefficient if there 
are more pawnshops located where individuals have access to payday loans and where a 
positive number of renewals is allowed.  Border Interest will also have a positive 
coefficient if there are more pawnshops located where individuals have access to payday 
loans with higher interest rates.        
I also control for the different interest rates on pawnshop loans for the bordering 
zip codes. Pawnshops' supply and demand may be affected by the difference in interest 
rates between states. I control for this effect using a dummy variable called Cheaper Out 
which is equal to one when pawnshop loans are cheaper in zip codes across the border. In 
the example above, zip codes within 25 miles of Tennessee and South Carolina would 
have a Cheaper Out variable equal to one because pawnshop interest rates are capped at 
lower levels in these two states than in Georgia.  Additionally, I control for the interest 
rate on pawnshop loans. If a state does not have a law capping interest rates, I set the 
interest rate equal to 25 percent (the maximum allowed in any other state).      
Because interstate highways ease transitions between states, they may increase 
access to payday and pawnshop loans in general.  I include an indicator variable equal to 
one if any part of a zip code is within a five-mile radius of an interstate 
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(NearInterstate).20  Three income variables are included in the regression: the log of 
median income for the zip code (Ln(MedianIncome)), percentage of the population in the 
zip code with income less than $15,000 (%PopulationLess15), and percentage of the 
population in the zip code with income between $15,000 and $50,000 
(%Populationbetween15&50).  Population density for each 1,000 square miles in the zip 
code controls for the relative density of the population in the zip code 
(PopulationDensity).  Additionally, I control for each state using a state-level dummy.        
The entire regression appears as follows:     
 
#ofPawnshopsz = β1Borderz + β2Border Legal with Renewals Allowedz + 
β3Border Legal with Renewals Prohibitedz  + β4NearInterstatez +   
β5Ln(MedianIncomez) + β6PawnRates + β7CheaperOutz + β8PopulationDensityz + 
β9%PopulationLess15z + β10%Populationbetween15&50z +  
constant + εz                                    (I-1) 
 
 
 
where #ofPawnshopsz is the number of pawnshops in a zip code. 
     
I.6 Results       
 
Table I-9 reports results from OLS and Poisson regressions on the number of 
pawnshops located in a zip code.  Columns (1) and (3) show OLS and Poisson results 
when not including dummies for renewals.  Columns (2) and (4) include Border Legal 
with Renewals Allowed and Border Legal with Renewals Prohibited.  The coefficient on 
the variable Border Legal with Renewals Allowed is positive and significant in both 
columns (2) and (4).  Residing in a zip code that has access to renewals increases the 
                                                
20 “Because of the change in the nature of items pawned and the greater availability of 
transportation, today's pawnshops are more likely to be along highways in strip malls with ample 
parking.” (Johnson and Johnson, 1998, p. 12).  
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number of pawnshops in that zip code by 0.68 and 0.80, which is large considering the 
average number of pawnshops in each zip code is 0.45.  In other words, there are more 
pawnshops located in zip codes where individuals have access to payday loans with 
renewals.  Coupled with the results found in the previous section, that fact suggests that 
individuals are more likely to use pawnshops along with payday loans when they are 
allowed to roll over their payday loans.     
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Table I-9: Number of Pawnshops in a Zip Code 
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Border Legal with Renewals Prohibited is insignificant with small coefficients 
suggesting no relationship between the demand for pawnshops and payday loans when 
rollovers are not allowed.  The Border coefficient is economically and statistically 
insignificant in all specifications with coefficients ranging from 0.003 to 0.06.  The 
coefficient on Border State Interest Rate is negative in columns (2) and (4) and 
statistically significant, suggesting that access to payday loans with higher interest rates 
reduces the demand for pawnshops.  The economic effect of this impact is, however, 
small.  Higher interest rates on pawnshop loans within the state has a negative effect on 
the number of pawnshops.  Being near an interstate and population density has a 
statistically and economically significant positive effect on the number of pawnshops, 
while average zip code income has a negative effect on the number.        
More pawnshops are located in areas where individuals have access to payday 
loans with rollovers.  In conjunction with the empirical evidence that more people use 
payday loans and pawnshops together in states where rollovers are allowed, the evidence 
suggests that rollovers do affect the use of pawnshops.   
 
I.7 Discussion 
 While allowing rollovers may cause more individuals to use pawnshops, it may 
not be any more harmful to the borrowers than prohibiting rollovers.  On the due date of 
the payday loan, the borrower will have six options: 1) repay the loan; 2) default on the 
loan; 3) take out a new payday loan from a different lender to repay the loan; 4) renew 
the payday loan by using cash to pay the interest; 5) take out a pawnshop loan to renew 
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the loan; or 6) take out a pawnshop loan to repay the loan. If renewals are not allowed, 
then a borrower is left with options 1), 2), 3), and 6).        
The borrower's third option is to go to another payday lender, take out another 
payday loan and return to the original payday lender to repay the original loan plus 
interest.  Lawrence and Elliehausen (2008) find that 16.5 percent of respondents to their 
survey used one payday lender to pay off another lender.  However, this option is not 
always available.  A borrower may have a credit score high enough to get a payday loan 
at one institution but too low to get a loan at another.21   Additionally, some states and 
firms have maximum amounts that individuals can borrow.22  If the borrower took out the 
maximum amount possible on the first payday loan, then she can only take out an amount 
equal to or less than that in the next period.  If she does not have the cash to renew the 
loan that also means that she will not have enough cash to repay the original loan plus 
interest. 
The benefits and costs of rolling over a payday loan with pawnshops or payday 
loans will depend on the value of the item the borrower has to pawn and the interest rates 
on payday loans and pawnshops. If the interest rate on a payday loan is higher, then the 
cost from the payday loan may be greater and vice versa.  
If the borrower defaults on the loan, she would experience costs from defaulting 
but would not have to repay the loan.  Costs of defaulting include immediate pecuniary 
                                                
21 Taking out a payday loan does not affect an individual's regular credit score, but payday 
lenders use a different score provided by a company called Teletrack to determine whether 
individuals may access their payday loans.  The score reports whether a borrower has defaulted 
on a payday loan from another institution and whether she has outstanding loans from other 
institutions (Caskey, 2005).  Skiba and Tobacman (2011) show graphically that borrowers below 
a credit scoring threshold (as set by the individual lender) have almost no chance of securing a 
loan.  Individuals at or above the threshold have at least a 90 percent chance of obtaining the loan. 
22 Dobbie and Skiba (2011) report that firms in their data set will lend an amount of money up to 
but not exceeding half of an individual's net pay.  
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costs, the cost of exclusion from future borrowing opportunities (Skiba and Tobacman, 
2008), annoyance from collectors, and possible overdraft fees (Caskey, 2005).  
It is not clear whether defaulting or renewing a payday loan with a pawnshop loan 
has a higher utility in the long run.  Borrowers who are not allowed to roll over loans may 
be more likely to default while borrowers who can roll over loans may be more likely to 
use pawn loans.  The borrower will originally have a higher utility from pawning an item 
to renew the loan as long as the immediate cost of defaulting is greater than the utility 
loss of not having the item.  In future periods the borrower may lose the option of taking 
out a payday loan if she has defaulted.  If the borrower renews the loan with a pawnshop, 
she has more debt to repay and risks losing the pawned item permanently.  Skiba and 
Tobacman (2009) found that borrowers often default after rolling over the loan multiple 
times.  In the event that a borrower defaults on her payday loan after taking out a 
pawnshop loan, her utility would be higher if she defaulted in the first period rather than 
paying interest for multiple periods before defaulting.  If a borrower repays eventually, it 
is not clear whether defaulting or renewing was more welfare diminishing.     
 
I.8 Conclusion      
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), a product of the 2010 Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, opened this year with rule-
making power over traditional banking services as well as alternative financial products.  
Many of these products, including payday loans and pawnshop loans, are currently 
regulated at the state level.  With the potential national-level impact that the CFPB could 
have over these services comes the renewed need for research on consumers' financial 
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decisions and the impact of state laws, including on the interactions between payday 
loans and pawnshops.        
Payday loans are an expensive form of credit used by millions of low-income 
people each year.  State laws on payday loans vary in terms of the interest rate and the 
number of rollovers allowed (if any).  Recent papers on payday loans have focused on the 
welfare costs or benefits of allowing access to short-term credit.  This paper instead 
focuses on the impact of allowing rollovers on payday loans and how that affects the use 
of another form of non-traditional credit, pawnshop loans.  The paper is one of the few to 
look at the combined use of payday loans and pawnshops and the first to measure the 
impact of allowing rollovers.        
Using data from a survey conducted by the FDIC, I find that individuals living in 
areas where three or more rollovers are permitted are more likely to use pawnshops and 
payday loans.  Location data on pawnshops suggests that demand for pawnshops is 
greater when borrowers have access to payday loans with rollovers.  The utility impacts 
of rolling over payday loans need to be examined further.           
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I.9 APPENDIX 
with Paige Marta Skiba 
 
In this appendix, I present previously unreported statistics on pawnshop loans. 
Pawnshops have been around for centuries and by 2009, just under two percent of 
households in the United States had used a pawnshop loan in the past year. Detailed 
information on pawnshops is generally lacking in the literature, but with a unique 
transaction dataset from a pawnshop lender, we show information on pawnshop collateral 
and repayment using pawnshop transaction data between 1997 and 2004 from a 
proprietary dataset from a national pawnshop in Texas with multiple stores in operation.  
Information on collateral, due dates, and repayment probabilities as well as some 
demographic characteristics is included.  Additionally, we merge pawnshop data with 
transactional payday loan data to show the interplay between these two forms of credit.  
Pawnshop loans are short-term (typically thirty-day) loans backed by personal 
possessions.  An individual must show identification (to deter pawning stolen items) and 
forfeit their use of jewelry, stereo, or other material item for the duration of the loan.  If 
the individual returns at the due date of the loan with the loan plus interest, she can take 
the item home.  If she defaults on the item, she loses her rights to the good and the 
pawnshop will sell the item in their store.   
The majority of the loans are collateralized with jewelry, with over half of the 
items in the jewelry category consisting of rings, including men’s and women’s class and 
wedding rings (Figure I-2).  The next most popular category is TV’s and Electronics, 
including satellites, stereos, and CD players.  Individuals also pawn tools, household 
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items (such as vacuum cleaners), sporting equipment, guns, musical instruments, and 
camera equipment.   
 
 
Figure I-2: Collateral by Category 
Not surprisingly, the items pawned differ by the gender of the borrower.  Jewelry 
is the most popular item for women to pawn (over 60 percent of the pawned items by 
women are jewelry).  Meanwhile, less than 35 percent of the pawned items by men are 
jewelry and men are more likely to pawn electronics and tools than women.   
The value of the items pawned varies.  Guns have the highest average value of 
$147 with instruments ($116) and jewelry ($96.47) coming in second and third.  The 
overall average amount pawned about is $79.  The averages for all categories are shown 
in Table I-10. 
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Table I-10: Average Amount Pawned 
 
Collateral Category 
Number of 
Observations 
Average 
Amount 
Pawned 
Standard 
Deviation 
All 416,640 $79.45 90.76 
MISSING 8,169 $63.41 72.64 
CAMERA 
EQUIPMENT 4,261 $75.89 78.84 
ELECTRONICS 132,311 $58.62 62.40 
GUNS 8,104 $147.13 99.20 
HOUSEHOLD 
ITEMS 11,045 $42.80 45.14 
INSTRUMENTS 8,099 $116.91 105.40 
JEWELRY 207,664 $96.47 105.31 
MISC. ITEMS 3,895 $52.51 63.37 
TOOLS 33,092 $50.02 60.74 
 
 
I.9.1 Default 
 
The probability of repayment varies by the type of collateral, gender of the 
borrower, and the value of the item.  Figure I-3 depicts the probability of repaying and 
defaulting by the collateral category.  Instruments, guns, and jewelry have the highest 
probability of repayment, and lowest probability of defaulting.  Tools, household items, 
and miscellaneous items have the highest probability of defaulting and lowest probability 
of repaying.   In unreported statistics, women defaulted on forty percent of their loans 
while men only defaulted on 37 percent of their loans.   
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Figure I-3: Default by Collateral Category 
 
 
I.9.2 Sentimental Items 
 
 Individuals often pawn wedding and engagement rings which have sentimental 
value attached to them.  Pawning these items may serve as a commitment mechanism to 
encourage the individual to repay, or they might be the only item the borrower has 
available to pawn.  We examine the probability of repayment for “sentimental” and “non-
sentimental” items, counting sentimental items as wedding rings, class rings, engagement 
rings, and mother’s rings.  As shown in Figure I-4, when borrowers pawn sentimental 
items they are less likely to default and are more likely to repay the loan.   
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Figure I-4: Repayment on Sentimental Items 
 
 
Additionally, we regress the probability of default on the amount loaned, an indicator for 
each merchandise category, and month-year dummies.  Pawning a sentimental item 
significantly decreases the probability of defaulting by 6.7 percentage points.   
 
I.9.3 Relationship with Payday Loans 
 
We find that when borrowers are using a pawnshop loan within a day of their 
payday loan due date, they are more likely to renew the payday loan and less likely to 
repay the payday loan; their probability of defaulting however remains similar (Figure 
I-5).  This result, along with other literature, highlights an important relationship between 
payday loans and pawnshop loans and further reveals that payday borrowers are credit 
constrained if they need to turn to pawnshop loans as well and strengthens the argument 
for more research on these loans.   
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Figure I-5: Status of Payday Loan 
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CHAPTER II  
 
 
 
THE DIFFERENCE A DAY MAKES: MEASURING THE IMPACT OF PAYDAY 
LOAN LENGTH ON THE PROBABILITY OF REPAYMENT 
 
 
 
(with Paige Marta Skiba and Justin Sydnor) 
 
 
II.1 Introduction 
 
 Payday loans are short-term, high-interest, small-dollar loans, typically used by 
low income consumers.  A typically payday loan provides the borrower with around $300 
in cash that is collateralized with a personal check from the borrower.  The loan, along 
with an interest fee of around $50, comes due on the borrower’s next payday.  The short-
term nature of these loans results in very high effective annual interest rates, generally on 
the order of 500 percent.  This type of lending began in the 1990s and grew rapidly, with 
an estimated $40 billion in loans originated annually by 2007 (Stegman, 2007).  
 Payday loans are highly controversial.  One perspective is that payday loans 
provide an important source of credit to temporarily cash-strapped customers who would 
otherwise face bank overdraft fees, bounced checks, and late fees on bills.  Another view, 
however, is that payday loans appeal to borrowers who have fundamental problems with 
budgeting and self-control and simply exacerbate their problems by generating a new 
cycle of debt that goes unpaid and accumulates enormous amounts of interest (Caskey, 
2010).  
 The controversy over these different perspectives on payday lending is reflected 
in the active struggles of policymakers working to regulate the industry.  At the national 
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level, the newly formed Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) will have 
authority to regulate payday lending.  In a speech in January 2012, the recently appointed 
CFPB chief Richard Cordray stated that “[Regulators at the CFPB] recognize the need for 
emergency credit.  At the same time, it is important that these products actually help 
consumers, rather than harm them.  Now the Bureau will be giving payday lenders much 
more attention.”  Payday lending is effectively banned in thirteen states but a few states 
allow lending with almost no regulations (Stegman, 2007).  Many states are currently 
revising their regulations and appear to be searching to find a balance between providing 
access to needed credit while helping prevent debt-spiral problems for borrowers.  
Beyond outright bans, regulations can take a variety of approaches, including capping the 
interest rates on loans, capping loan amounts, limiting the ability of loans to be renewed 
or rolled over, and imposing minimum durations.  Several recent studies have examined 
the effect of payday loan borrowing.23  Although the results of this literature on whether 
payday loans help or hurt consumers are mixed, it does provide some hard evidence for 
policymakers weighing bans on payday loans.  There has, however, been much less 
research that would help inform less extreme regulations to limit but not ban payday 
lending.  
 In this paper we study the effect of increasing the length of time a borrower has to 
repay a payday loan.  This is a question of interest for policymakers and a subject of 
recent regulatory changes.24  For example, as part of a broader revision to payday lending 
regulations in 2009, Virginia began requiring that payday borrowers be given at least two 
                                                
23 See, for example, Carrell and Zinman (2008), Graves and Peterson (2005), Melzer (2011), 
Morse (2011), Skiba and Tobacman (2011), Stegman and Faris (2003), Stoianovici and Maloney 
(2008) and Zinman (2010). See also Caskey (2011) for a nice overview. 
24 The consumer group Center for Responsible Lending advocates that states “Limit the loan 
amount as well as the length of the loan.” 
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pay cycles (rather than the typical one) to repay their loans.  There are two primary 
mechanisms through which regulations increasing loan durations could benefit 
borrowers.  First, as long as interest charges are held constant, loans with longer 
durations will have lower annualized borrowing costs.  A second potential benefit, and 
the focus of our research, is that having more time to repay the loan may make it more 
feasible for a borrower to repay an initial payday loan and hence help him or her avoid a 
debt spiral.  The extent to which having longer to repay will help people avoid rolling 
loans over, however, likely depends on the underlying reasons for payday borrowing.  
Payday loans with more time to repay should be most useful for those who are using 
payday loans to overcome a very temporary shock.  Those whose use of payday loan 
reflects more of a chronic budget problem are less likely to change their decisions about 
rolling over a loan simply because of a little extra time to pay back the loan. Ultimately, 
whether or not having more time to repay a loan affects repayment behavior is an 
empirical question. 
 We attempt to answer this question using a unique dataset on payday loan 
transactions provided by a large payday lending company that is active in a number of 
states.  Our goal is to explore how different loan durations, holding all else constant, 
affect the probability that a borrower will repay the loan, rather than rolling it over or 
defaulting.  To do that we focus on borrowers taking out new loans and exploit variation 
in the length of time a borrower has to repay a loan—variation that is generated by the 
combination of state-level regulations on minimum loan lengths and the institutional 
feature that loans come due on a payday.  For example, if we focus on states with 
regulations that loans must be at least seven days long, borrowers who come in for a 
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payday loan seven days before their next paycheck will in fact get a loan for seven days.  
However, a borrower who comes in six days before their next paycheck will have much 
longer to repay because their loan will be due two paychecks later.  For borrowers paid 
biweekly, the jump in loan durations is thirteen days; while for those who are paid 
monthly coming in for a payday loan one day later can increase the time to repay by 
nearly a month.  
 We analyze the effect of these discontinuous jumps in loan lengths for a range of 
different pay-frequency and state-level regulation combinations.  Throughout, we find 
statistically significant, but very modest, impacts of longer loan durations on repayment. 
Our estimates show that an additional week to repay a new loan, all else equal, increases 
the probability of repayment for borrowers paid biweekly (our largest group) by 
approximately 2.4 percentage points, which is roughly a 5 percent increase from the 
baseline repayment rate of 48 percent.  
 Of course, this empirical strategy is valid only to the extent that borrowers who 
come in six days before a paycheck are similar to borrowers who come in seven days 
before a paycheck. Because that decision is at the discretion of the borrower, it could be 
that there is something fundamentally different about these two groups of borrowers. 
Given our finding that loan length has little impact on repayment, the type of selection 
problem we worry about here is the possibility that higher-risk borrowers (those less 
likely to repay) value the extra time to repay more and make up a disproportionate share 
of the borrowers who come in six days prior to being paid, effectively eliminating the 
benefits of longer loans that we would otherwise observe.  Fortunately, we have a large 
amount of data about our customers, including observable information on the size of the 
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loan they choose to take out, their sub-prime credit score, whether they own a home, their 
recent checking-account balance, their net paycheck amounts, their race, their age, and 
their gender.  We look for differences in these measures at our discontinuity point for 
each of the different specifications in our data and generally find no meaningful 
differences.  This result suggests that borrowers who come in six or seven days before are 
not different on observable dimensions.  Including controls for these observables in a 
regression does not make loan length a significant predictor of repayment, and in fact 
tends to diminish the estimated effect of loan length on repayment.  
 Our finding that increasing the length of loans has little impact on repayment 
behavior is relevant both for policy discussions and for those interested in better 
understanding the motivations of payday loan borrowers.  On the policy end, our results 
suggest that the benefit of regulations requiring longer loan lengths comes only from the 
ability of those regulations to lower effective annualized interest rates.  There is no 
evidence that such a policy will help borrowers avoid a pattern of repeat borrowing that 
becomes very costly over time.  This result is an important, and unfortunate, realization 
for policy discussions because requiring longer loan durations is an easier regulation to 
implement than a regulation that restricts rollovers.  Effectively limiting rollovers 
requires regulators to develop a system that can track rollover behavior both for an 
individual payday lender and more importantly across payday lenders, since without such 
a system borrowers could simply use a payday loan from a different lender to repay an 
initial loan.  Our analysis suggests that policymakers concerned with limiting loan 
renewals will likely need to focus on these types of efforts rather than relying on simpler 
reforms such as requiring longer loan durations.  
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 In terms of understanding borrower behavior, we discuss in Section II.2 that time-
inconsistent borrowers will respond less to an increase in loan lengths than time-
consistent borrowers (i.e., those with self-control problems) because the time-inconsistent 
borrowers are less willing to save in the intervening periods to help their “future selves” 
repay the loan.  Our results are consistent, then, with the idea that the failure to repay 
initial payday loans is driving demand for payday loans—but this phenomenon may 
largely be attributed to people who have time-inconsistency problems that result in 
chronic budgeting problems.  These results complement recent findings from Bertrand 
and Morse (2011) showing that “psychology-guided information disclosures” that help 
customers think more broadly about the consequences of repeat payday borrowing help to 
lower use of payday loans.  They are also consistent with the simulation results from 
Skiba and Tobacman (2008), who find that predominant patterns of payday loan 
borrowing are most consistent with partially naïve time-inconsistent preferences.  
 Though numerous papers have studied the consequences of borrowing with 
payday loans, to our knowledge, ours is the first to study the effect of loan durations and 
adds to a small literature that has started to analyze the impact of different features of 
payday loans. Carter (2011) studies the impact of allowing rollovers and concludes that 
borrowers are more likely to use payday loans and pawnshops together when rollovers 
are allowed. Li, Mumford, and Tobias (2011) simulate the impact of a change in the 
number of rollovers allowed, interest rates, and maximum loan amounts to study their 
impact on the amount borrowed, the length of time the loan is held, and the probability of 
default.  They conclude that limiting rollovers will reduce the probability of ultimate 
default.  Dobbie and Skiba (2011) study the impact of loan sizes on the probability of 
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default using discontinuity in loan-size eligibility rules by state and conclude that while 
those who endogenously choose larger loans are more likely to default, an exogenous 
increase in loan amount leads to a modest reduction in default rates.  
This work also complements a literature in microfinance that has explored the 
effect of loan terms on repayment rates with mixed results.  This literature has focused on 
the frequency of repayment, which serves a role similar to that of the loan length in the 
payday loan market.  Pollio and Obuobie (2010) find no significant effect of decreasing 
the frequency of repayment on borrowers’ default or delinquency rates.  Field and Pande 
(2008) conduct a field experiment randomizing borrowers into biweekly and monthly 
repayment schedules and find no significant effect of repayment rates between the arms 
of the study.  Armendariz and Morduch (2005) describe studies that find that decreasing 
the frequency of repayment does increase the delinquency rate for borrowers.  On the 
other hand, McIntosh (2008), in a study of microfinance in Uganda, finds that there is a 
slight increase in loan repayments for those paid biweekly as opposed to weekly—
although since borrowers self-selected into the two groups there is possible selection bias.  
  
II.2 Theoretical Framework 
 
 Imagine two situations, one where the payday loan is due on the borrower’s next 
payday and one where a borrower has two pay periods to repay it.  In Period 1, the 
individual takes out an initial payday loan.  In a “short-duration” setting, a loan is due in 
Period 2 and the borrower has the ability to renew the loan one time and have it come due 
in Period 3 with an extra interest charge.  The “long-duration” setting is nearly identical 
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(with interest rates remaining the same), except the initial loan is due in Period 3 with the 
option in that period to rollover the loan to Period 4.  
 Consider first the case of a rational time-consistent borrower with standard 
exponential discounting. When deciding whether or not to renew the initial loan, the 
borrower compares the utility gain from smoothing the burden of repayment over two 
periods (Period 2 and Period 3 in this case) with the utility loss that comes from paying 
an extra interest charge.  That basic tradeoff exists whether the initial loan is due in 
Period 2 (“short duration”) or Period 3 (“long duration”).  In the “long duration” case, 
however, Period 2 has the option to save some money (i.e., reduce consumption) to help 
ease the burden on Period 3, thereby making it more attractive to repay the loan in Period 
3 and avoid the extra interest charge. That is, in the “long duration” case the borrower has 
the ability to smooth the repayment shock over two periods at no cost. In the “short 
duration” case the only way to smooth over two periods (instead of just one period) is to 
incur the interest cost.  It is straightforward to show that in an environment with 
stochastic income, the rational borrower will repay the initial loan with higher probability 
if there is an extra period.  
 Imagine the borrower is instead (partially) naïve and time inconsistent.  The extra 
period to repay the loan in the “long-duration” case has less of an impact on the 
probability of repayment for these borrowers.  The intuition is rather simple: For a time-
consistent borrower, the advantage of the additional period in the “long-duration” setting 
is that in the intervening period the borrower restrains her consumption somewhat and 
saves money for the period when the loan is due. The naïve time-inconsistent borrower 
saves much less in the intervening period. Because she is overoptimistic about the level 
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of patience of her future self, in the intervening period in the “long-duration” setting, the 
borrower does not save much to help smooth consumption.  Thinking that the next 
period’s self will be patient and willing to “take the hit” of repaying the loan, the 
borrower during the intervening period (wrongly) believes that she does not need to save 
very much to influence her future self’s repayment decision.  
 As with most hyperbolic discounting models, we cannot rule out that borrowers 
are not just mis-predicting their income stream, rather than mis-predicting their 
preferences (as we just discussed).  To receive a payday loan, a borrower needs to show a 
steady source of income, so we believe this issue would not be driving the results.   
 
II.3 Data 
 
 We use administrative records from a large national payday lender.  Data consist 
of loan applications made between January 2000-August 2004.  From these applications 
we glean information on loan size, application date and maturation date, finance charge, 
employer, pay frequency, net pay, subprime credit score,25 homeownership, gender, race 
and checking-account balance from the most recent bank statement.  These variables 
serve as our main controls in our regressions described below.  We also observe the 
outcome of each loan: whether the loan was repaid in full, defaulted on, or renewed.  A 
borrower is in default if the lender is unable to collect on the post-dated check (for the 
loan amount plus interest) provided at the time of the application.  This sample includes 
2,250,166 loans. 
                                                
25 This credit score differs from traditional FICO scores. For more on the payday lending credit 
score, see Agarwal, Skiba and Tobacman (2009). 
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 We restrict our sample in two ways. First, we include only “new loans,” that is, 
first-time applications and those loans that come from borrowers who had not taken out a 
loan within the past 90 days.  By restricting the sample in this way, we ensure that the 
loans we are observing are not rollovers from previous loans.  Second, for continuity we 
restrict our analysis to states where rollovers are allowed and the minimum loan length is 
seven days (Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah).26 Our final 
sample consists of 184,177 loans.  
Table II-1 reports summary statistics of these data. The typical borrower is 37 
years old and female.  Forty-six percent of the borrowers are black and 28 percent 
Hispanic.  The implied annual salary of the average borrower is $21,663.06 net of taxes. 
Nearly three-quarters of the borrowers use direct deposit to receive their paychecks.  Half 
of borrowers receive biweekly paychecks.  The other half is a mix of borrowers who are 
paid semimonthly (16 percent), monthly (17 percent) or weekly (12 percent).  Default 
rates are 15 percent on “new” loans.  Thirty-eight percent of borrowers are homeowners, 
though there is no information on homeownership recorded in the data for a sizeable 
fraction of the sample.  
                                                
26 Several states changed their duration restrictions during our sample so we restrict to 
observations where the minimum loan length during that month is seven. 
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Table II-1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
II.4 Empirical Strategy 
 
 We implement two empirical strategies to identify the effect of loan durations on 
repayment and default.  First, we run cross-sectional regressions of the following form: 
Mean S.D. Min. Max N
Borrower Charateristics
Age 37.29 10.99 18 70 182,741
Female 0.63 0.48 0 1 87,030
White 0.24 0.43 0 1 86579
Black 0.46 0.50 0 1 86579
Hispanic 0.28 0.45 0 1 86579
Race, Other 0.01 0.10 0 1 86579
Home Ownership 0.38 0.48 0 1 93,608
Months at Residence 67.49 85.35 1 456 182,455
Credit Score 499.58 193.20 200 1,000 182,213
Checking Account Balance 263.51 436.75 -499.86 2,999.82 178,117
Net Pay per Year 21,663.06 10,075.53 4,200 81,388.84 173,236
Fraction Direct Deposit 0.73 0.44 0 1 184,159
Loan Characteristics
Amount Loaned 284.03 137.05 55.59 968 184,209
Interest Charge 50.62 24.63 10.01 174 184,209
Loan Length 13.89 5.69 7.00 45 184,209
Repayment Probabilities
Fraction who Repay 0.41 0.49 0 1 184,209
Fraction who Renew 0.45 0.50 0 1 184,209
Fraction who Default 0.15 0.35 0 1 184,209
Pay Frequency 
Fraction Paid Biweekly 0.50 0.50 0 1 184,177
Fraction Paid Semimonthly 0.16 0.36 0 1 184,177
Fraction Paid Monthly 0.17 0.38 0 1 184,177
Fraction Paid Weekly 0.12 0.33 0 1 184,177
NOTES: This table reports summary statistics for a payday lending firm between 2000 and 2004.  
The sample represents first time applicants and borrowers who had not taken out a loan for 90 
days.  States where the minimum loan length is seven and borrowers are allowed to roll over 
their loan are represented in the sample.  
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 Pr(repayi) = ß0 + ß1(# days to repayi) + ei                            (II-1)  
  Pr(repayi) = ß0 + ß1(# days to repayi) + X’i + e i.                      (II-2)   
 
 
That is, we use a linear probability model regressing an indicator for repayment on the 
number of days a borrower has to repay.  The regression represented in Equation II-2 
includes our full set of controls described above plus month and year controls. Second, 
we implement a regression discontinuity approach. 
Regression discontinuity (RD) designs are an increasingly common approach to 
estimate the causal impact of an intervention absent a true randomized experiment.  In 
general, this method exploits some exogenous threshold that determines assignment to a 
“treatment” and “control” group.27 
In our payday framework, the treatment is a longer loan duration created by the 
constraints states place on minimum loan lengths.  Our threshold bifurcates borrowers 
into those who arrive at the payday lender six or fewer days before their next payday 
(“treatment”) and those who arrive seven or more days before their next payday 
(“control”).  Though the two types of borrowers at the threshold arrive just one day apart, 
their loan lengths differ in a discontinuous way.  (One group receives a seven-day loan 
and the other a 20-day loan in the biweekly-borrower case). 
To estimate the effect on repayment rates from this discontinuity, we simply 
compare the probability of repayment for borrowers on either side of the threshold.  To 
appropriately attribute any differences in these probabilities to loan lengths per se, 
borrowers on either side of the threshold must not be significantly different from each 
                                                
27 Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) pioneered the approach. For econometric foundations, see 
Hahn, Todd and der Klaauw (2001) and McCrary (2008). Angrist and Lavy (1999), and Imbens 
and Lemieux (2008) provide useful guides for best practices. 
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other in other ways.  Our first evidence of borrowers being similar at the threshold are 
plots of covariates across the threshold (described in more detail below).  We will also 
formally test whether borrowers to the left and right of the threshold vary in an important 
way using demographics we can observe in our data (including credit score, age, race, 
gender, income, etc.).  As long as these observable characteristics capture the relevant 
differences that could affect repayment behavior (i.e., no important unobservable 
characteristics), the regression discontinuity estimates will be valid.  We can additionally 
restrict our sample to those borrowers closest to the threshold as described below.  By 
restricting our analysis to a narrow window, we are comparing treatment and control 
groups who are most similar to each other save the treatment. 
More formally, our running variable is the number of days until a borrower’s next 
paycheck on the day the borrower arrives at the lender.  For borrowers paid biweekly, 
days until next paycheck is assumed to be the loan length as long as the loan length is less 
than 14.  For borrowers who have a loan length greater than 14, then we assume their 
days until next paycheck equals their loan length minus 14.  Because the minimum loan 
length is seven, if a borrower enters payday lenders with less than seven days until he is 
paid, the due date of his loan will be the days until paid plus 14 (the time until his next 
pay date).  
We also have a sample of borrowers paid monthly through Social Security checks 
paid out on the 3rd of the month. Borrowers in this sample will again experience a 
discontinuity in loan length if they arrive less than seven days before the 3rd of the month. 
Days until next paycheck was calculated as a borrower’s loan length if he took out a loan 
after the 3rd of the previous month. If he took out the loan prior to the 3rd of the previous 
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month, then days until paid was calculated as the 3rd of the previous month minus the day 
the loan was taken out. For example, if a borrower took out a loan on the 5th of June and 
the due date of the loan was the 3rd of July, then days until paid would be 28.  If a 
borrower took out the loan on the 30th of May, then days until paid would be five (June 3 
– May 30).  
Finally, we split the sample into borrowers paid semimonthly who typically have 
pay dates on either the 15th or the first (the most popular due dates for semimonthly 
borrowers in our sample).28  In these regressions our running variable is day of the month.  
Discontinuities in average loan length occur between the 8th and 9th of the month and the 
23rd and the 26th. The second discontinuity is not as sharp as the first because some 
months have 28, 29, 30, and 31 days.  
For our first stage, we estimate the following equation: 
Loan Lengthi = ß0+ ß1(days_until_next_paychecki) +            
ß2(<7_days_before_next_paychecki) +  
 ß3 (days_until_next_paychecki) x (<7_days_before_next_paychecki) + ei       (II-3)      
                                                                                    
 
Our results exploring repayment rates for all borrowers come from a similar regression 
but with the dependent variable being repayment: 
Repayi = ß0+ ß1(days_until_next_paychecki) +  
ß2 (<7_days_before_next_paychecki) + 
 ß3 (days_until_next_paychecki) x (<7_days_before_next_paychecki) + ei       (II-4) 
        
 
 
                                                
28 Borrowers paid semi-monthly differ from bi-weekly borrowers in that they are paid twice a 
month, at the beginning of the month and the middle.  Borrowers paid bi-weekly are paid once 
every two weeks.   
57 
 
        
For ease of interpretation, we subtract six days from the variable days until next 
paycheck. With 7 days until the next pay date, the coefficient ß1 represents the impact that 
coming in that day has on the probability of repayment.  When a borrower comes in 6 
days before their next payday, then the days until next paycheck (minus 6), equals 0, so 
the impact of coming in 6 days before your next paycheck (beyond the effect of the 
controls) is equal to ß2.  The coefficient ß2 plus the coefficient ß1 in Equation (4) can 
therefore be interpreted as the percentage-point difference in repayment rates from taking 
out a payday loan six days before one’s payday compared to seven.  
 
II.5 Results 
 
 First, we present raw data on each pay cycle.   Figure II-1 presents the sample of 
biweekly-paid borrowers, restricted to those paid on Fridays.  The x-axis of each of the 
five plots shows the days until receipt of the borrower’s next paycheck. Y-axes plot loan 
amount, net pay, credit score, frequency of applications, and homeownership rates.  The 
discontinuity in loan lengths is replicated in each figure with a noticeable jump in loan 
length at seven days.  The figures are comforting for our research design in that there are 
no noticeable jumps in observations (or any jumps for four of the five figures) near the 
discontinuity. Figure II-2 shows the same results as Figure II-1 but for biweekly 
borrowers paid on Thursday.29 
                                                
29 There is a drop in observations twelve days and five days before the next payday for biweekly 
borrowers paid on Friday and eleven and four days before the next payday for biweekly 
borrowers paid on Thursday.  These days fall on Sundays when the payday lender is closed.   
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 Figure II-1: Bi-Weekly Borrowers Paid on Friday 
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Figure II-2: Bi-Weekly Borrowers Paid on Thursday 
 
 
  
 In Figures II-3 and II-4, we plot repayment rates and initial loan length for 
biweekly borrowers paid on Fridays and Thursday, respectively.  The figures show there 
is a slight increase in repayment occurring at the discontinuity.  We do the same analysis 
for Social Security recipients paid on the 3rd of the month, and the pictures look similar.     
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Figure II-3: Fraction of Bi-Weekly Borrowers Paid on Friday who Repay Loan 
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Figure II-4: Fraction of Bi-Weekly Borrowers Paid on Thursday who Repay Loan 
 
 
 
 Next we run reduced form regressions.  Equations (II-1) and (II-2) are estimated 
separately for biweekly, weekly, semi-monthly, and monthly borrowers (i.e., Social 
Security recipients).  Results are presented in Table II-2.  Univariate regressions 
(Columns 1-4) show that the correlation between loan length and repayment is negative 
and significant for biweekly and monthly borrowers.  The correlation is positive and 
significant for weekly borrowers and small and insignificant for semi-monthly borrowers. 
Columns 5-8 add the full set of controls.  Controlling for observables, we see positive and 
significant, but small, effects of loan lengths for biweekly and weekly borrowers. The 
results are positive but very small and insignificant for semi-monthly borrowers and 
significant but negative for monthly borrowers.  
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Table II-2: Probability Repay 
 
 
 
 
 To estimate the effect using the plausibly exogenous variation created by states’ 
restriction on loan-length minimums, we turn to our regression discontinuity.  Table II-3 
Dependent Variable: Dummy Variable Equal to 1 if an Individual Repays his/her Payday Loan
Bi-Weekly Monthly Weekly Semi-Monthly Bi-Weekly Monthly Weekly Semi-Monthly
Mean Loan Length (in weeks) 1.85 1.49 2.72 1.96 1.85 1.49 2.72 1.96
Loan Length (in weeks) 0.018*** -0.025*** 0.041*** -0.00071 0.0094*** -0.012*** 0.046*** 0.000082
(0.003) (0.002) (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.009) (0.004)
Loan Amount ($100) -0.049*** -0.030 -0.068 -0.054
(0.018) (0.028) (0.049) (0.034)
Home Ownership 0.045*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.012
(0.005) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
Credit Score (Per 100) 0.079 0.0013 0.036 0.36
(0.089) (0.109) (0.109) (0.242)
Age 0.00023 0.00017 0.00048 -0.000017
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Female -0.027*** -0.017** -0.0090 -0.042***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Finance Charge -0.0033*** -0.0035** -0.0034 -0.0025
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Checking Balance ($100) 0.0072*** 0.0070*** 0.010*** 0.0063***
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Months at Residence -0.000052** 0.000032 -0.00011*** 0.0000098
(0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00004)
Net Pay ($1000) 0.0097*** 0.011*** 0.0068*** 0.0075***
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Owns Home 0.032*** 0.018* -0.0040 0.014
(0.006) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010)
Black -0.073*** -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.095***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011)
Hispanic -0.025*** -0.043*** -0.017 -0.035***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012)
Race, Other 0.0059 -0.087** 0.026 0.044
(0.022) (0.037) (0.043) (0.041)
Month X Year Dummies Included X X X X
State Dummies Included X X X X
Number of Observations 92,568 31,953 22,896 29,063 90,830 31,343 22,562 28,501
Adjusted R-squared 0.0005 0.0031 0.0009 0.000 0.0906 0.0758 0.0585 0.0882
NOTES: Table II-2 presents the results from an OLS Regression on the liklihood of repaying a payday loan.  Dummies for missing home ownership, 
months in residence, age, checking account balance, net pay, and credit score variables included in columns 5 through 8.  The ommitted category for 
race is white.  Standard errors are in parentheses underneath each coefficient. The sample of payday loan borrowers include first time applicants and 
borrowers who had not taken out a loan for 90 days.  States where the minimum loan length is seven and borrowers are allowed to roll over their loan 
are represented in the sample.   *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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reports the results from Equation II-4. The first four columns use no controls, while 
Columns 5 through 8 include a number of controls which may affect repayment rates—
loan amount, homeownership, credit score, age, gender, interest payment, month at the 
residence, net pay, and race.  Columns 1 and 5 include only individuals who are paid 
biweekly. We further split these individuals into two groups: those paid on Thursdays 
(Columns 2 and 6) and those paid on Fridays (columns 3 and 7).  Columns 4 and 8 
restrict the sample to Social Security recipients receiving benefits on the 3rd of the month.  
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Table II-3: Regression Discontinuity, Probability Repay 
  
  
Dependent Variable: Dummy Variable Equal to 1 if an Individual Repays his/her Payday Loan
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Biweekly
Biweekly 
Paid on 
Thursday
Biweekly 
Paid on 
Friday Monthly Biweekly
Biweekly 
Paid on 
Thursday
Biweekly 
Paid on 
Friday Monthly
Days until Paid (minus 6) -0.0087***-0.0070*** -0.012*** -0.0033*** -0.0057*** -0.0058** -0.0068*** -0.0020**
(0.0009) (0.0024) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0028) (0.0012) (0.0010)
Less than 7 Days Until Paid 0.033*** 0.022 0.031*** -0.012 0.012* 0.0075 0.015 -0.021
(0.0064) (0.0171) (0.0077) (0.0506) (0.0074) (0.0265) (0.0118) (0.0516)
Days until Paid (minus 6) 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.031*** 0.039** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.026
    X Less than 7 Days Until Paid (0.0019) (0.0051) (0.0023) (0.0168) (0.0020) (0.0056) (0.0026) (0.0173)
Loan Amount ($100) -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.13***
(0.0015) (0.0040) (0.0018) (0.0102)
Home Ownership 0.045*** 0.036*** 0.044*** 0.048**
(0.0052) (0.0136) (0.0063) (0.0241)
Credit Score (Per 100) 0.0023 0.0073 0.0015 -0.0068
(0.0020) (0.0053) (0.0024) (0.0085)
Age 0.00040** -0.00011 0.00053** 0.0015**
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0007)
Female -0.026*** -0.065*** -0.021*** -0.0092
(0.0053) (0.0140) (0.0063) (0.0201)
Interest Rate -0.031*** -0.040*** -0.029*** -0.058***
(0.0024) (0.0061) (0.0031) (0.0096)
Checking Balance ($100) 0.0071*** 0.0078*** 0.0069*** 0.0046*
(0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0005) (0.0025)
Months at Residence -0.000013 0.0000048 -0.000027 0.00020***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Net Pay ($1000) 0.0094*** 0.0096*** 0.0093*** 0.011***
(0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0016)
Black -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.051*** -0.044*
(0.0065) (0.0166) (0.0078) (0.0236)
Hispanic -0.029*** -0.018 -0.031*** -0.079***
(0.0072) (0.0189) (0.0086) (0.0282)
Race, Other -0.0040 -0.094 0.024 -0.0013
(0.0253) (0.0578) (0.0316) (0.1118)
Month X Year Dummies Included X X X X
State Dummies Included X X X X
Dummy for Day of Week Taken Out X X X X
Constant 0.42*** 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.51***
(0.0044) (0.0121) (0.0052) (0.0163)
Number of Observations 91,833 12,878 63,599 5,162 90,119 12,608 62,537 5,064
Adjusted R-squared 0.0035 0.0023 0.0053 0.0031 0.0776 0.0834 0.0759 0.0530
NOTES: Table II-3 presents the results from an OLS Regression on the likelihood of repaying a payday loan.  Less than 7 Days until Repaid is an indicator 
variable equal to one if there were less than 7 days until the borrowers next pay date.  6 days are subtracted from the Days Until Paid variable for ease of 
interpretation.  Dummies for missing home ownership, months in residence, age, checking account balance, net pay, and credit score variables included in 
columns 5 through 8.  The omitted category for race is white.  Standard errors are in parentheses underneath each coefficient. The sample of payday loan 
borrowers include first time applicants and borrowers who had not taken out a loan for 90 days.  States where the minimum loan length is seven and borrowers 
are allowed to roll over their loan are represented in the sample.   Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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For all biweekly borrowers and biweekly borrowers paid on Friday, results suggest there 
is a 3.1 to 3.3 percentage-point increase in the probability of repayment when the 
individual comes in to take out their loan six days before their payday when no controls 
are included. The effect for biweekly borrowers paid on Thursday is even smaller (2.2 
percentage points).  The estimated probability of repayment actually decreases by 0.12 
percentage points at the threshold for those paid monthly; however, neither of those 
effects are statistically significant.  All of these results become smaller and lose statistical 
significance when full controls are added, except for monthly borrowers, which stay 
significant but the effect falls to 1.2 percentage points. 
 In the above regressions, we used the constructed days until paycheck variable 
dependent on loan length.  Now, we will do the same analysis for semi-monthly 
borrowers but instead relying on the day of the month, relative to the 15th, that they took 
out the loan.  In Figures II-5 and II-6, we graphically show the discontinuity in the loan 
length as well as the credit scores, homeownership, net pay, number of observations, loan 
amount and probability of repayment over the days until paid.  As confirmation that loan 
length is significantly different between 6 and 7 days before the payday loan due date, we 
run the first stage regression for semi-monthly borrowers based on the day they took out 
their loan.  We subtract all days after the 15th to focus on the first discontinuity.  In this 
regression, the independent variable we focus on is day of the month.  For ease of 
interpretation, we subtract nine days from this day, and have the discontinuity occur at 
the 9th day of then month (when there are less than 7 days until repayment on the 15th).  
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Figure II-5: Semi-Monthly Borrowers 
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 Figure II-6: Fraction of Semi-Monthly Borrowers Paid on Thursday who Repay Loan 
 
 
 
 Table II-4 presents these first stage results.  The coefficient on Less than 7 days 
until Paid is significantly positive, economically and statistically.  Coming in on the 9th 
causes an increase in the average loan length of 10 days.  Our second state regression is 
reported in Table II-5.  Coming in on the 9th in this case has no impact (the coefficient is 
between 0.00089 and -0.0072) on the probability of repayment.  These results confirm the 
previous estimations that, in this case, an increase in the average loan length of 10 days 
has no effect on the probability of repayment.   
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Table II-4: Regression Discontinuity, Loan Length for Semi-monthly Borrowers 
 
(1) (2)
Day of Month (minus 9) -0.74*** -0.74***
(0.0183) (0.0186)
Less than 7 days until Paid 9.99*** 10.0***
        (9th of Month or Later) (0.1496) (0.1498)
Day of Month (minus 9) 0.15*** 0.15***
       X Less than 7 days until Paid (0.0353) (0.0358)
Loan Amount ($100) 0.029
(0.0316)
Home Ownership -0.039
(0.1205)
Credit Score (Per 100) -0.10**
(0.0448)
Age -0.0025
(0.0039)
Female -0.049
(0.1194)
Interest Rate -0.19**
(0.0804)
Checking Balance ($100) 0.0026
(0.0080)
Months at Residence -0.00021
(0.0005)
Net Pay ($1000) 0.0032
(0.0045)
Black -0.11
(0.1354)
Hispanic -0.10
(0.1537)
Race, Other 0.18
(0.7065)
Month X Year Dummies Included X
State Dummies Included X
Dummy for Day of Week Taken Out X
Constant 8.57***
(0.0934)
Number of Observations 14,641 14,355
Adjusted R-squared 0.3505 0.3537
Dependent Variable: Loan Length
Borrowers Paid Semi-Monthly
NOTES: Table II-4 presents the results from an OLS Regression on the likelihood of repaying a payday loan.  Less than 
7 Days Pay Day is an indicator variable equal to one if there were less than 7 days until the borrowers next pay date.  6 
days are subtracted from the Day of Month variable for ease of interpretation.  Dummies for missing home ownership, 
months in residence, age, checking account balance, net pay, and credit score variables included in columns 5 through 8.  
The omitted category for race is white.  Standard errors are in parentheses underneath each coefficient. The sample of 
payday loan borrowers include first time applicants and borrowers who had not taken out a loan for 90 days.  States 
where the minimum loan length is seven and borrowers are allowed to roll over their loan are represented in the sample.   
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
69 
 
Table II-5: Regression Discontinuity, Probability Repay for Semi-monthly Borrowers 
 
  
(1) (2)
Day of Month (minus 9) 0.0097*** 0.0048**
(0.0025) (0.0024)
Less than 7 days until Paid 0.00089 -0.0072
        (= 9th of Month or Later) (0.0169) (0.0166)
Day of Month (minus 9) -0.027*** -0.015***
       X Less than 7 Days until Paid (0.0042) (0.0041)
Loan Amount ($100) -0.096***
(0.0036)
Home Ownership 0.011
(0.0143)
Credit Score (Per 100) 0.019***
(0.0051)
Age -0.00028
(0.0005)
Female -0.044***
(0.0145)
Interest Rate -0.023***
(0.0085)
Checking Balance ($100) 0.0061***
(0.0010)
Months at Residence -0.000032
(0.0001)
Net Pay ($1000) 0.0072***
(0.0005)
Black -0.063***
(0.0167)
Hispanic -0.029
(0.0187)
Race, Other 0.0056
(0.0597)
Month X Year Dummies Included X
State Dummies Included X
Dummy for Day of Week Taken Out X
Constant .45***
(0.012)
Number of Observations 14,641 14,355
Adjusted R-squared 0.0032 0.0685
NOTES: Table II-5 presents the results from an OLS Regression on the likelihood of repaying a payday loan.  Less than 7 Days Pay Day is an 
indicator variable equal to one if there were less than 7 days until the borrowers next pay date.  6 days are subtracted from the Day of Month variable 
for ease of interpretation.  Dummies for missing home ownership, months in residence, age, checking account balance, net pay, and credit score 
variables included in columns 5 through 8.  The omitted category for race is white.  Standard errors are in parentheses underneath each coefficient. 
The sample of payday loan borrowers include first time applicants and borrowers who had not taken out a loan for 90 days.  States where the 
minimum loan length is seven and borrowers are allowed to roll over their loan are represented in the sample.   Standard errors are clustered at the 
individual level.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Dependent Variable: Dummy Variable Equal to 1 if an Individual Repays his/her Payday Loan
Borrowers Paid Semi-Monthly
70 
 
While all of the aforementioned regressions use a linear regression estimation, we run all 
of our results for the outcome of success using a probit estimation, rather than OLS 
estimations, and find the results unchanged.   
 
II.6 Robustness 
 
 In some states in our sample, the minimum loan length in a particular month was 
greater than 7, ranging from 8 to 31 days. We estimate the first stage regressions for 
semi-monthly borrowers in states without seven-day minimums, and there is actually a 
decrease in the average loan length between 6 and 7 days before the next pay date.  There 
is between a 1.3 and 3.2 percentage point increase in the probability of repayment 
between the cut off, but this result is not statistically significant, even if the control 
variables are not included.  These results are reported in Table II-6.   
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Table II-6: Probability Repay for States with Minimum Loan Lengths Greater than Seven 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Day of Month (minus 9) -0.0020 -0.0093 -0.0022 0.063
(0.0111) (0.0107) (0.1498) (0.1026)
Less than 7 days until Paid 0.013 0.032 -2.67*** -2.48***
        (= 9th of Month or Later) (0.0641) (0.0618) (0.6859) (0.4535)
Day of Month (minus 9) 0.00050 0.0073 -0.036 -0.075
       X Less than 7 Days until Paid (0.0114) (0.0110) (0.1523) (0.1041)
Loan Amount ($100) -0.090*** 0.17*
(0.0103) (0.0872)
Home Ownership 0.066* -0.038
(0.0355) (0.3289)
Credit Score (Per 100) 0.038** -1.02***
(0.0151) (0.1433)
Age 0.0020* 0.014
(0.0012) (0.0109)
Female -0.049 0.13
(0.0437) (0.3503)
Interest Rate 0.0058*** 0.57***
(0.0017) (0.0141)
Checking Balance ($100) 0.0036 0.020
(0.0028) (0.0267)
Months at Residence -0.00022 -0.0012
(0.0001) (0.0014)
Net Pay ($1000) 0.0054*** 0.015
(0.0015) (0.0131)
Black 0.0051 -0.21
(0.0426) (0.3572)
Hispanic 0.23*** -1.93***
(0.0688) (0.5467)
Race, Other -0.24** -3.57***
(0.1205) (1.1953)
Month X Year Dummies Included X
State Dummies Included X
Dummy for Day of Week Taken Out X
Constant 0.51 24.26
(0.055) (0.601)
Number of Observations 2,304 2,257 2,304 2,257
Adjusted R-squared -0.0009 0.0816 0.0430 0.5622
Loan LengthSuccess
States with Minimum Loan Lengths greater than 7
NOTES: Table II-6 presents the results from an OLS Regression on the likelihood of repaying a payday loan.  Less than 7 Days Pay Day is 
an indicator variable equal to one if there were less than 7 days until the borrowers next pay date.  6 days are subtracted from the Day of 
Month variable for ease of interpretation.  Dummies for missing home ownership, months in residence, age, checking account balance, net 
pay, and credit score variables included in columns 5 through 8.  The omitted category for race is white.  Standard errors are in parentheses 
underneath each coefficient. The sample of payday loan borrowers include first time applicants and borrowers who had not taken out a 
loan for 90 days.  States where the minimum loan length is seven and borrowers are allowed to roll over their loan are represented in the 
sample.   Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
72 
 
We follow McCrary (2008) and test for distortions in density on either side of the 
cutoff by running our regression discontinuity with the outcome variable being the 
fraction of people in the sample (separately for each pay frequency).  The results of the 
test are found in Table II-7.  We did find a statistically significant change in the number 
of people taking out loans; however, this affect is in the range of -1.88 to 0.47 percentage 
point changes.   
 
 
Table II-7: Percentage of Observations 
 
 
 
 
We then verify that controls are not changing around the cut-off.  If individuals 
with higher credit scores are arriving 7 days before they are paid, then it might bias the 
results against finding any effect of longer loan lengths.  These results are reported in 
Tables II-8 through II-12 for each pay period.  Credit scores are significantly lower for 
borrowers arriving 6 days before the pay date, but the magnitudes of these effects are 
small.  Semi-monthly borrowers arriving 6 days before their next paycheck have an 
increase in their checking account balance of $38.  Monthly borrowers are 12 percentage 
All Bi-Weekly Bi-Weekly Thursday Bi-Weekly Friday Monthly Semi-monthly
Days until Paid (minus 6) -0.13*** 0.11*** -0.34*** -0.036*** 0.14***
(0.0018) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0018) (0.0042)
Less than 7 Days Until Paid -0.65*** 0.47*** -1.88*** -2.75*** -1.52***
(0.0213) (0.0056) (0.0029) (0.0310) (0.0217)
Days until Paid (minus 6) 1.22*** 1.14*** 1.34*** 0.14*** -0.57***
    X Less than 7 Days Until Paid (0.0046) (0.0029) (0.0016) (0.0058) (0.0067)
Month x Year Dummies X X X X X
State Dummies X X X X X
N 91833 12878 63599 5162 14641
adj. R-sq 0.6703 0.9894 0.9941 0.5751 0.7226
NOTES: Table II-7 presents the results from an OLS Regression on the percentage of observations each day.  Less than 7 Days Pay Day is an indicator variable equal 
to one if there were less than 7 days until the borrowers next pay date.  6 days are subtracted from the Day of Month variable for ease of interpretation. Standard errors 
are in parentheses underneath each coefficient. The sample of payday loan borrowers include first time applicants and borrowers who had not taken out a loan for 90 
days.  States where the minimum loan length is seven and borrowers are allowed to roll over their loan are represented in the sample.   Standard errors are clustered at 
the individual level.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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points less likely to be female.  Bi-weekly borrowers paid on Friday are younger, and bi-
weekly borrowers paid on Thursday are taking out larger loans.  Bi-weekly borrowers in 
general, however, are taking out smaller loans and have a lower net pay.   
 
 
Table II-8: Controls for Bi-Weekly Borrowers 
 
Amount (in $100) Homeownership Credit Score (in 100 points) Age Female
Days until Paid (minus 6) 0.026*** -0.0019*** -1.4e-13*** -0.041** 0.0032***
(0.0025) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0203) (0.0009)
Less than 7 Days Until Paid -0.069*** -0.0093* -4.4e-13*** -0.25 0.0020
(0.0205) (0.0055) (0.0000) (0.1610) (0.0071)
Days until Paid (minus 6) -0.060*** 0.00014 2.1e-13*** 0.044 -0.0082***
    X Less than 7 Days Until Paid (0.0056) (0.0015) (0.0000) (0.0432) (0.0019)
Month x Year Dummies X X X X X
State Dummies X X X X X
N 91833 91833 91833 91833 91833
adj. R-sq 0.0485 0.1289 1 0.0058 0.0094
Interest Rate Checking Account Balance Months in Residence Net Pay ($1,000)
Days until Paid (minus 6) -0.00070 -0.038*** -0.19 -0.26***
(0.0006) (0.0079) (0.1578) (0.0180)
Less than 7 Days Until Paid -0.0083* -0.038 -1.03 -0.35**
(0.0049) (0.0628) (1.3802) (0.1444)
Days until Paid (minus 6) -0.0010 0.063*** 0.39 0.46***
    X Less than 7 Days Until Paid (0.0014) (0.0169) (0.3604) (0.0385)
Month x Year Dummies X X X X
State Dummies X X X X
N 91833 91833 91833 90119
adj. R-sq 0.81 0.0041 0.0092 0.0196
NOTES: Table II-8 presents the results from an OLS Regression on the control variables.  Less than 7 Days Pay Day is an indicator variable equal to one if there were less than 7 days until the borrowers 
next pay date.  6 days are subtracted from the Day of Month variable for ease of interpretation. Standard errors are in parentheses underneath each coefficient. The sample of payday loan borrowers include 
first time applicants and borrowers who had not taken out a loan for 90 days.  States where the minimum loan length is seven and borrowers are allowed to roll over their loan are represented in the 
sample.   Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table II-9: Controls for Bi-Weekly Borrowers Paid on Thursday 
 
 
 
 
 
Table II-10: Controls for Bi-Weekly Borrowers Paid on Friday 
 
Amount (in $100) Homeownership Credit Score (in 100 points) Age Female
Days until Paid (minus 6) 0.017** -0.0031 -2.2e-14*** -0.017 0.0050
(0.0085) (0.0023) (0.0000) (0.0707) (0.0030)
Less than 7 Days Until Paid -0.13* -0.013 -2.5e-14 0.48 0.032
(0.0735) (0.0196) (0.0000) (0.6028) (0.0260)
Days until Paid (minus 6) -0.063*** -0.0038 9.5e-14 0.24* -0.0040
    X Less than 7 Days Until Paid (0.0158) (0.0041) (0.0000) (0.1230) (0.0054)
Month x Year Dummies X X X X X
State Dummies X X X X X
N 12878 12878 12878 12878 12878
adj. R-sq 0.0453 0.1298 1 0.0044 0.01
Interest Rate Checking Account Balance Months in Residence Net Pay ($1,000)
Days until Paid (minus 6) 0.0011 -0.037 0.83 -0.28***
(0.0023) (0.0250) (0.5248) (0.0596)
Less than 7 Days Until Paid 0.024 0.18 4.87 -0.47
(0.0200) (0.2187) (4.8073) (0.5211)
Days until Paid (minus 6) 0.0023 0.17*** 0.46 0.41***
    X Less than 7 Days Until Paid (0.0042) (0.0470) (1.0594) (0.1134)
Month x Year Dummies X X X X
State Dummies X X X X
N 12878 12878 12878 12608
adj. R-sq 0.8059 0.0043 0.0097 0.0194
NOTES: Table II-9 presents the results from an OLS Regression on the control variables.  Less than 7 Days Pay Day is an indicator variable equal to one if there were less than 7 days until the borrowers 
next pay date.  6 days are subtracted from the Day of Month variable for ease of interpretation. Standard errors are in parentheses underneath each coefficient. The sample of payday loan borrowers include 
first time applicants and borrowers who had not taken out a loan for 90 days.  States where the minimum loan length is seven and borrowers are allowed to roll over their loan are represented in the 
sample.   Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Amount (in $100) Homeownership Credit Score (in 100 points) Age Female
Days until Paid (minus 6) 0.036*** -0.0023** 8.9e-16 -0.084*** 0.0021*
(0.0036) (0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0283) (0.0013)
Less than 7 Days Until Paid -0.022 -0.012 -2.5e-12*** -0.79*** -0.013
(0.0331) (0.0088) (0.0000) (0.2562) (0.0116)
Days until Paid (minus 6) -0.059*** 0.00030 -2.1e-12*** -0.031 -0.0096***
    X Less than 7 Days Until Paid (0.0074) (0.0019) (0.0000) (0.0567) (0.0025)
Month x Year Dummies X X X X X
State Dummies X X X X X
N 63599 63599 63599 63599 63599
adj. R-sq 0.0388 0.1315 1 0.0076 0.0096
Interest Rate Checking Account Balance Months in Residence Net Pay ($1,000)
Days until Paid (minus 6) -0.0015* -0.037*** -0.35 -0.27***
(0.0008) (0.0117) (0.2189) (0.0252)
Less than 7 Days Until Paid -0.014* -0.078 -2.83 -0.16
(0.0077) (0.1046) (2.0095) (0.2291)
Days until Paid (minus 6) -0.00018 0.046** 0.054 0.56***
    X Less than 7 Days Until Paid (0.0018) (0.0229) (0.4469) (0.0506)
Month x Year Dummies X X X X
State Dummies X X X X
N 63599 63599 63599 62537
adj. R-sq 0.7748 0.0042 0.0102 0.0208
NOTES: Table II-10 presents the results from an OLS Regression on the control variables.  Less than 7 Days Pay Day is an indicator variable equal to one if there were less than 7 days until the borrowers 
next pay date.  6 days are subtracted from the Day of Month variable for ease of interpretation. Standard errors are in parentheses underneath each coefficient. The sample of payday loan borrowers include 
first time applicants and borrowers who had not taken out a loan for 90 days.  States where the minimum loan length is seven and borrowers are allowed to roll over their loan are represented in the 
sample.   Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table II-11: Controls for Monthly Borrowers 
 
 
 
 
Table II-12: Controls for Semi-Monthly Borrowers 
 
 
 
 
 
Amount (in $100) Homeownership Credit Score (in 100 points) Age Female
Days until Paid (minus 6) 0.011*** 0.00030 -1.3e-15*** 0.060 0.0015
(0.0023) (0.0008) (0.0000) (0.0473) (0.0011)
Less than 7 Days Until Paid -0.077 -0.050* 1.2e-13*** 1.06 -0.12**
(0.1031) (0.0269) (0.0000) (2.2350) (0.0491)
Days until Paid (minus 6) -0.10** -0.010 4.1e-14*** 1.23 -0.049***
    X Less than 7 Days Until Paid (0.0433) (0.0094) (0.0000) (0.8732) (0.0176)
Month x Year Dummies X X X X X
State Dummies X X X X X
N 5162 5162 5162 5162 5162
adj. R-sq 0.0146 0.207 1 0.0029 0.0078
Interest Rate Checking Account Balance Months in Residence Net Pay ($1,000)
Days until Paid (minus 6) -0.0011 -0.0016 0.10 -0.027*
(0.0010) (0.0075) (0.2934) (0.0157)
Less than 7 Days Until Paid -0.018 -0.042 -7.25 -1.09
(0.0396) (0.3576) (11.7945) (0.7105)
Days until Paid (minus 6) -0.0027 -0.13 -2.29 -0.21
    X Less than 7 Days Until Paid (0.0117) (0.1239) (4.1861) (0.2537)
Month x Year Dummies X X X X
State Dummies X X X X
N 5162 5162 5162 5064
adj. R-sq 0.6644 0.0041 0.009 0.0086
NOTES: Table II-11 presents the results from an OLS Regression on the control variables.  Less than 7 Days Pay Day is an indicator variable equal to one if there were less than 7 days until the borrowers 
next pay date.  6 days are subtracted from the Day of Month variable for ease of interpretation. Standard errors are in parentheses underneath each coefficient. The sample of payday loan borrowers include 
first time applicants and borrowers who had not taken out a loan for 90 days.  States where the minimum loan length is seven and borrowers are allowed to roll over their loan are represented in the 
sample.   Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Amount (in $100) Homeownership Credit Score (in 100 points) Age Female
Day of Month (minus 6) -0.049*** 0.0014 3.5e-14* 0.023 -0.00028
(0.0072) (0.0015) (0.0000) (0.0504) (0.0023)
Greater than 6 Days Until Paid 0.014 0.0044 -1.9e-13* 0.49 0.0037
(0.0499) (0.0104) (0.0000) (0.3453) (0.0151)
Day of Month (minus 6) 0.093*** 0.0017 -3.9e-14 -0.059 0.0049
       X Greater than 6 Days Until Paid (0.0126) (0.0027) (0.0000) (0.0883) (0.0038)
Month x Year Dummies X X X X X
State Dummies X X X X X
N 14641 14641 14641 14641 14641
adj. R-sq 0.0436 0.1494 1 0.0053 0.0183
Interest Rate Checking Account Balance Months in Residence Net Pay ($1,000)
Day of Month (minus 6) -0.0011 -0.028 0.71* 0.062
(0.0014) (0.0230) (0.3811) (0.0520)
Greater than 6 Days Until Paid 0.0074 0.38** 1.95 0.42
(0.0105) (0.1600) (2.6111) (0.3633)
Day of Month (minus 6) 0.0017 -0.066* -0.74 -0.28***
       X Greater than 6 Days Until Paid (0.0026) (0.0396) (0.6779) (0.0906)
Month x Year Dummies X X X X
State Dummies X X X X
N 14641 14641 14641 14355
adj. R-sq 0.6377 0.0047 0.008 0.0157
NOTES: Table II-12 presents the results from an OLS Regression on the control variables.  Less than 7 Days Pay Day is an indicator variable equal to one if there were less than 7 days until the borrowers next 
pay date.  6 days are subtracted from the Day of Month variable for ease of interpretation. Standard errors are in parentheses underneath each coefficient. The sample of payday loan borrowers include first time 
applicants and borrowers who had not taken out a loan for 90 days.  States where the minimum loan length is seven and borrowers are allowed to roll over their loan are represented in the sample.   Standard 
errors are clustered at the individual level.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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II.7 Conclusion 
 States are considering numerous options to regulate payday loans, and several are 
moving toward regulating the lengths borrowers can take out a payday loan.  Our analysis 
suggests this will have little impact on repayment.  We use individual-level transaction 
data and exploit a discontinuity in loan lengths caused by state minimum loan length laws 
of 7 days and the fact that payday loans are due on your payday.   
 If the intent of changes in regulations is to lower the APR paid by borrowers, then 
we do not find any negative impacts of allowing longer loans.  If the intent of the 
regulations is to give an individual more time to repay and thus increasing their ability to 
repay, then our study finds no impacts of these regulations.   
 As states consider changes in the loan lengths, it will be important to study the 
effects on the supply side.  If longer minimum loan lengths reduce profits for the lender, 
it might be expected that the lender will adjust whom it lends to by becoming more 
selective.  In our sample, however, cut-offs did not vary by state.  Within states, lenders 
also do not adjust the interest rate based on the length of the loan.   
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CHAPTER III  
 
 
 
HOMEOWNERSHIP POST BANKRUPTCY 
 
 
 
III.1 Introduction 
 
Bankruptcies are common in the U.S. with 1.5 million households filing in 2010, 
a 27 percent increase in bankruptcies from 2009 (US Courts, 2010).  The purpose of 
bankruptcy is to free an individual from debt obligations and give them a ‘fresh start.’ 30    
While a number of studies investigate who files for bankruptcy and why,31 there is less 
information on what happens to someone after she files. Bankruptcy laws are federal, but 
states may set their own exemptions that specify the assets an individual may retain after 
bankruptcy.  These exemption laws affect the supply and demand of credit in the state, as 
well as who files for bankruptcy.  This chapter will help to determine whether bankruptcy 
improve their assets enough to own a home, controlling for the role of state exemptions, 
after they file for bankruptcy. 
When choosing to file for bankruptcy, an individual must decide between filing 
chapter 7 or chapter 13.  Both chapters help to alleviate the pressures brought on by 
overdue debt; however, they have very different procedures.  If a person files under 
chapter 7, her non-exempt assets are liquidated to pay off creditors and those debts that 
are not repaid are discharged.  If an individual has exempt assets (such as a home), she 
may keep the home but must continue paying the interest payments.  The assets that are 
exempt vary by state.  While in some states a person’s residence is completely exempt, in 
                                                
30 See Braucher, 2004, for a good explanation. 
31 See for example: Fay, Hurst, White, 2002; White, 2010; White, 2007; White, 1998. 
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other states there are very low or even no homestead exemptions.  Under chapter 13, 
however, a filer proposes a three to five year repayment plan.  Instead of having all of 
their non-secured debts discharged, they must pay a portion of them back from their 
future income over a set time period.  Often people file under chapter 13 to keep from 
losing their house (White and Zhu, 2010).  
Zagorsky and Lupica (2008) examine post bankruptcy filers’ financial statuses 
years after they file; however, they do not consider exemptions due the fact that their 
dataset that does not give location where the individual filed.   They find that chapter 7 
bankruptcy filers catch up to non-filers in terms of their homeownership after 13.5 years.  
Chapter 13 filers surpass their non-filer comparison group.  It has been shown that 
individuals filing in states with low levels of bankruptcy exemptions have lower assets 
than in states with high homestead exemptions.  If a study does not distinguish between 
these two groups, estimates on assets post-bankruptcy may be over estimated.  
I use data from the 1996 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which asked 
questions on whether, when, and where individuals had filed for bankruptcy.   Using 
cross-sectional data from the 1996 PSID, I find evidence that (after controlling for 
demographics) those individuals filing in states with low homestead exemption are 40 
percentage points less likely to own a home within a year after filing compared to the 
average individual in the state, and while that magnitude decreases the more time that 
passes since the individual filed, individuals are still 26 percentage points less likely to 
own a home ten years after bankruptcy.  I do not find any evidence that bankruptcy filers 
are any different than non-filers using two other measures of financial health: food stamp 
use and owning a business. Bankruptcy filers in states with high levels of exemptions 
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appear the same as non-filers with respect to homeownership; however, these results are 
difficult to interpret given the small sample of bankruptcy filers in that group.    
Chapter 7 filers have a statistically significant 55 percentage point lower 
probability of owning a home than the average non-filer.  The chapter 7 filers are 19.1 
and 31.2 percentage points less likely to own a home as time passes suggesting some 
improvement from the time they filed.  Interestingly, while chapter 13 filers are 2.6 
percentage points more likely to own a home within a year of filing for bankruptcy, 
chapter 13 filers two to ten years and more than ten years after bankruptcy are 23 and 21 
percentage points less likely to own a home. The difference in the probability of owning a 
home is not statistically different between chapter 7 and chapter 13 filers two to ten years 
out and more than then years out.  So, while chapter 13 filers may be filing to save their 
home (and are equally as likely to own a home when they file), their probability of 
owning a home diminishes and does not recover even 10 years after filing.   
Using the panel nature of the PSID, I confirm that bankruptcy filers in states with 
low homestead exemptions have similar patterns before and after filing for bankruptcy 
regardless of whether they filed in the 1980s or the 1990s.  In both cases, homeownership 
status is significantly below the average in the rest of the country.  
I focus on homeownership in this paper because it is typically the largest portion 
of individuals assets, easy to identify, and is believed to provide positive benefits.32 Rossi 
and Weber (1996) find a relationship between homeownership and life satisfaction, self-
esteem, and community improvement.  DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) find that 
                                                
32 This believed benefit is reflected in the fact that $80 billion of tax revenue was forgone in the 
United States in 2007 as a result of the Mortgage Interest Deduction.  Over $477 billion dollars in 
mortgage interest were deducted in 2007 (Brannon et. al (2011)). 
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homeowners build greater social capital for their community as a result of their longer 
tenure in the area from owning a home as opposed to renting.  
There are costs to society of filing for bankruptcy, in addition to the costs that it 
might cause creditors.  These costs include legal and administrative costs of the 
bankruptcy procedure, as well as direct costs, such as increased interest rates by the 
creditor or negative social stigma attached to the individual from filing. If 
homeownership by filers increases after bankruptcy, then the positive homeowner 
benefits might make up for some of the costs.  I find no evidence that individuals filing in 
states with low homestead exemptions are able to reach the status of non-filers post-
bankruptcy with respect to homeownership and limited evidence of improvement over 
time. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to look at post-bankruptcy 
homeownership status while taking into account the differences in exemption laws.  
 
 
III.2 Exemptions 
 
While there is a federal exemption level (set in title 11 section 522(2) of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code), a number of states have opted out of federal exemptions.  If a state 
opts out, then its citizens must use the state exemption level.  In some states, such as 
Texas, a consumer’s entire homestead is exempt, thus they will not lose their home by 
filing a chapter 7, but they still must continue paying their mortgage.  Other states, such 
as Pennsylvania, have little or no homestead exemptions, and all non-exempt assets are 
sold by the bankruptcy trustee at auctions and the proceeds are used to pay off some of 
the debt.   If a state has not opted out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions, then a citizen 
in that state can choose either the state’s exemption levels or the federal exemption levels 
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(not a combination of the two).  Presumably, the individual would choose the higher 
exemption.  Table III-1 presents the homestead exemptions by state and whether 
individuals are allowed to file under the federal exemption levels.   
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Table III-1: Homestead Exemptions by State 
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Exemption laws have been shown both theoretically and empirically to affect the 
supply and demand for credit in a given state, as well as affect who files for bankruptcy.33 
As a simple model to show this, consider an individual who accumulates assets, A, and 
debt, D, in period one.  If she files for bankruptcy in period 2 in a state with exemption 
levels of E, then she will keep min[A, E].  If his assets are less than the exemptions, then 
she will be able to keep all of his assets.  If the exemption level is less than his assets, she 
will only be able to keep the exemption level.  Assuming the individual is risk averse, 
then she would prefer to live in a state with higher exemptions, and she will build up 
more assets as long as the exemption level is higher.   
Higher exemption laws, however, lead to tighter credit constraints.  Assume a 
lender is risk neutral, the risk free interest rate is R, and the interest rate she is willing to 
lend at is r.  She will be willing to lend Dt, as long as  
 (1-Prob(file))*[Dt(1+r)]+ Prob(file)*max{A-E,0}≥ Dt(1+R). 
In other words, as long as the expected repayment when the borrower does not file 
(Dt(1+r)) plus his expected payment if the borrower files for bankruptcy (max{A-E,0}) is 
greater than his outside option of lending in a risk free environment, then she will lend.  
If exemption levels increase and the probability of filing stays the same (for 
simplification), the lender will constrain the credit market either through increasing 
interest rates or decreasing the amount allowed to borrower.   
Lin and White (2001) confirm empirically that there is credit rationing by finding 
that individuals in unlimited exemption states, as opposed to states with low exemptions, 
are more likely to be turned down for a mortgage and a home improvement loan.  Taking 
                                                
33Pavan (2008) simulates that higher exemptions on net have negative welfare impacts but that 
small (as opposed to none) exemptions are beneficial.   
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this further, Gropp, Scholz, and White (1997) find evidence that the high asset borrowers 
are able to obtain more credit from an increase in demand in high exemption states while 
low asset borrowers obtain less credit. They conclude that exemption laws redistribute 
credit towards high asset borrowers.  
Corradin et. al (2011) investigate whether state homestead bankruptcy exemptions 
affect homeownership and home equity of individuals.  They find no evidence that 
exemption laws affect the probability of owning a home in general; however, they do find 
that higher exemption laws increase the equity that individuals put into a home.  One 
argument for higher homestead exemption laws is based on the idea that it may increase 
the desirability of owning a home, which has positive externalities.  Their paper, 
however, does not find evidence that would support this argument.   
Higher exemptions surprisingly lead to fewer bankruptcies in that state (see, for 
example, Shiers and Williamson, 1987).34  Initially, it would appear that more people 
would file for bankruptcy when exemption levels are high since a filer would be left with 
more assets when she leaves bankruptcy. However, because exemption laws affect access 
to credit by lenders, it affects who gets into more financial trouble. 
Miller (2011) uses a hand-collected sample of bankruptcy filers along with a 
sample of (mostly) non-filers and finds that high bankruptcy exemptions increase the 
probability that households with high levels of assets file for bankruptcy, meanwhile high 
                                                
34While the general consensus has been that exemption laws lead to lower filing rates, Dawsey 
and Ausubel (2004) find that people in states with high garnishment laws are more likely to file 
for bankruptcy, while in states where creditors are not allowed to garnish wages people are more 
likely to not file for bankruptcy and instead go through what they call “informal bankruptcy.”  
Informal bankruptcy refers to people who do not go through bankruptcy proceedings but stop 
making their payments.  They use variation in garnishment laws to help explain why states with 
high exemptions (where you would expect more people to file), have lower filing rates than states 
where there are lower exemptions.   
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garnishment rates increase the probability that households with low income file for 
bankruptcy.  She supports this evidence with a two-period theoretical model.   
These results suggest that high homestead exemptions help wealthier individuals 
in terms of accessing credit and giving them a higher incentive to file. When studying 
individuals after filing, it is important to distinguish between these two groups of filers 
since they have different wealth levels and are faced with different credit markets.  If a 
study combines the two, then it may over-estimate the assets of filers. 
 
III.3 What Happens Post Bankruptcy? (Previous Literature) 
 
Studying bankruptcy filers post-filing is important for determining the impact of 
bankruptcy on individuals.  A few studies have begun to investigate whether bankruptcy 
is a turning point as designed.  While these papers are all important in understanding 
whether bankruptcy provides the ‘fresh start’ as intended, to the best of my knowledge, 
my paper is the first to look at post-bankruptcy statuses while taking into account the 
differences in exemption laws.    
 Thorne and Porter (2006) survey chapter 7 bankruptcy filers one year after filing 
and ask them questions on their ability to pay bills and on their financial situation in 
general compared to what it was before.  While the majority of people were better off (65 
percent), 27 percent were the same, and 8 percent were actually worse off.  Their study is 
important and informative, but it is limited by the length of time between the filing and 
the survey response (just one year).  
Fisher and Lyons (2010) and Han and Li (2009) examine the credit market for 
borrowers after they have filed for bankruptcy.  Fisher and Lyons find that a bankruptcy 
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flag, which is placed on an individual’s credit report for ten years post-filing, increases 
the likelihood of an individual being denied credit, increases the interest rate for 
unsecured loans, and decreases credit limits.  Similarly Han and Li (2009) explore the 
effects on supply and demand for credit post bankruptcy using the Survey of Consumer 
Finance.  They find that bankruptcy filers, not surprisingly, pay higher interest rates for 
all debt.  Meanwhile, the filers borrow more with secured debt as availability to 
unsecured debt is more limited.  Their results also show that filers do not often have a 
real ‘fresh start’ as they struggle with access to credit.    
Zagorsky and Lupica (2008)’s analysis of post-bankruptcy filers is the most 
closely related to my own.  In their paper, they compare bankruptcy filers in the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979.  The authors study the differences between 
individuals that file for bankruptcy and those that do not by combining individuals in all 
states without distinguishing between whether they are filing in a low or high exemption 
state.  They find that bankruptcy filers take between 12 and 24 years to catch up to non-
filers in terms of total income, net worth, and homeownership.  Bankruptcy filers, 
however, are more likely to own a car (and have car debt) and work more hours.  
 
III.4 Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
 
This chapter uses survey responses from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID).  The PSID is a nationally representative study that follows families through time 
starting in 1968.  Survey responses include information such as health, income, 
employment, and residence location.  In 1996 the survey asked a question about past 
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bankruptcy filings.  Respondents reported if and when they filed for bankruptcy and how 
many times.  
I use both the panel aspect of the data as well as a cross-section from 1996 when 
the question was asked.  For the cross-section data, I compare individuals who have filed 
in high (low) asset exemption states to non-filers in high (low) asset exemption states, 
and I rely on the variation in time since filing.  In 1996, they also asked a number of other 
questions related to the financial health of the family.  In addition to studying the effects 
on homeownership, I look at two other measures of financial health: food stamp usage 
and owning a business.  I then use the panel aspect of the PSID to study the 
homeownership decision of each individual from before they file for bankruptcy until 
after.  
Table III-2 reports summary statistics on individuals in the PSID.  The sample 
includes 8,491 total people reported with 525 having filed for bankruptcy in the past.  
Bankruptcy filers in states with low homestead exemptions are less likely to own a home, 
are more likely to be divorced and unemployed, and less likely to have either a college or 
graduate degree.  Respondents who filed for bankruptcy in states with high homestead 
exemptions are more likely to use food stamps and have lower levels of education, but 
are equally as likely to own a home.   
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Table III-2: Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
There are a few limitations of the dataset.  The first issue is that the bankruptcy 
question was only asked in 1996; therefore, I cannot study the impact of the 2005 Federal 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act.35   Another limitation is that 
detailed wealth variables (including assets and debts) only began to be asked in 1984 and 
were just asked every five years until 2001.  Family income, however, is tracked every 
year, as well as divorce, education, and homeownership.  
It is important to note that there are only 525 observations of bankruptcy filers, 
and when splitting between states with high and low exemptions, only 102 observations 
                                                
35 In 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) dramatically 
changed the bankruptcy laws by increasing the costs of filing and re-specified who is eligible to 
file under chapter 7.  One of the provisions of the act requires debtors to complete a debtor 
education course prior to filing (Elias, 2009).  It serves as a deterrent for filing, but it is 
presumably also intended to help debtors successfully emerge from bankruptcy.  By studying who 
struggles after a filing, it will give a clearer picture of who the education policies should target 
and how.  In addition to requiring financial education, BAPCPA forced people to wait longer 
before filing for bankruptcy a second time.   
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in high-asset exemption states.  Therefore, following others that have used the same 
dataset, I treat all bankruptcy filers as the same and do not distinguish between chapter 7 
and chapter 13 in my initial analysis.  I then split those living in states with low 
homestead exemption into those filing for chapter 7 and chapter 13 to measure any 
affects that filing for a specific chapter has on ability to repay.  Additionally, because of 
the low number of observations for states with high exemptions, I cannot make 
conclusive statements about these filers.   
 
III.5 Empirical Strategy 
 
 I investigate whether filing for bankruptcy affects the likelihood that someone 
owns a home, runs a business, or relies on food stamps relative to the average individual 
in the state.  If bankruptcy really gives someone a ‘fresh start,’ then those individuals 
who file for bankruptcy may resemble non-filers years after they file for bankruptcy.  
Additionally, if they are showing improvement over time, then the borrowers would 
begin approaching the same homeownership level as non-filers.  I compare filers to non-
filers in the same states because exemptions affect who selects into filing for bankruptcy.  
Thus, if I compare people in high exemption states to low exemption states I would be 
comparing people with different incentives to file.  In robustness checks, I run a 
difference in difference regression and look at the changes in homeownership since 
filing.  Finally, a bankruptcy flag is placed on a filers credit report for 10 years, which 
will affect an individual’s access to credit, so I will want to consider those filers who no 
longer have the flag.   
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 According to the Social Security Administration, households must be below 
certain income and resource requirements to qualify for food stamps.  Presently, a family 
cannot have more than $2,000 in resources, which includes cash, money in bank 
accounts, and other property (“Food Stamp Facts,” 2012).  I use the question in the PSID 
on whether a family had used food stamps in the past year as an indicator of poor 
financial health of the household.   
 As mentioned before, a bankruptcy system provides individuals with consumption 
insurance and encourages entrepreneurship.   Risk averse individuals will be more willing 
to borrow or start a business with a bankruptcy system that provides protection in the 
event of an unexpected shock or unsuccessful business venture (White, 2009).  In fact, a 
number of famous (and now wealthy) individuals have filed for bankruptcy in the past.  
Walt Disney and Milton Hershey are just a couple of people who had businesses fall into 
bankruptcy before they were able to emerge and have successful ventures.  Owning a 
business after bankruptcy would be a signal of ‘fresh start.’ 
For all three outcomes, I begin measuring the impact of filing for bankruptcy and 
the time since filing using all people who had filed for bankruptcy, regardless of the state 
where the person files.  I then categorize states into two groups: those where homestead 
exemptions are less than the median house price in that state (according to the census in 
1990 and 2000) and those where the homestead exemption are greater than or equal to 
median state house price.  In states where individuals have the option of filing under the 
federal or state exemptions, I use the maximum of the two exemptions.  I run a probit 
regression separately for the two types of states to measure whether there appears to be a 
differing effect between the two. 
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My basic probit regression appears as follows: !(!! = 1) =Φ[!! !"#$%  !"#ℎ!"  !ℎ!  !"#$  !"#$ + !! !"#$%  2  !"  10  !"#$%  !"# +!! !"#$%  !"#$  !ℎ!"  10  !"#$%  !"# + !!!], 
 
where !! is an indicator for someone using food stamps, owning a business, or owning a 
home and Φ is the normal cumulative distribution function.  The three time variables 
indicate how long ago someone filed for bankruptcy (if they filed).  All three variables 
are equal to zero if the individual never filed.  !! is a vector of demographics, including 
number of children, and age.  !! also includes dummies for the head of the household 
being female, the head being black, the head being neither white nor black, and a dummy 
if race is missing are also included.  I include a square on the number of children to test 
whether there is a diminishing effect and include a quartic function of age to provide a 
flexible form of the variable.  As education may also affect whether an individual owns a 
home or a business, I include dummies for whether someone graduated from high school, 
graduated from college, or attended graduate school.  The omitted category is not 
graduating from high school.  Finally, I cluster the results at the state level, and I weight 
the results using the PSID weighting to give a representative sample.36   
To measure whether people are improving over time, I need to assume that people 
who filed in the 1980s are filing for the same reason as people who filed in the 1990s.  If 
the people filing in different decades have different probabilities of owning a home, then 
                                                
36 Unfortunately the PSID does not give information whether individuals live in cities or not.   
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it will show how people fare years after filing, but I cannot compare the outcomes over 
time.  
 Using the panel aspect of the PSID I compare bankruptcy filers across decades to 
examine the differences directly for each group.  Figure III-1 reports these results.  
 
 
 
Figure III-1: Probability of Owning a Home in Low-Homestead Exemption States 
 
Figure III-1 plots the fraction of people owning a home for bankruptcy filers in the 1980s 
and 1990s.  The figure shows that filers in the 1980s had a higher probability of owning a 
home in the 1980s.  Individuals who filed in the 1990s have an increasing probability of 
owning a home after filing for bankruptcy. 37   In un-reported results, I regress 
homeownership on a dummy for filing in the 1980s for each year since filing; the dummy 
on filing in the 1980s has no affect.  
                                                
37 When examining this graph for high exemption states, there do appear to be differences 
between decades, but the number of observations is again small, making it hard to analyze.    
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III.6 Results 
 
 I start with an examination of how people fare years after filing for bankruptcy, 
regardless of the exemptions offered after bankruptcy.  These results are reported in 
Table III-3.  In the first column, the first three variables (Filed within the past year, Filed 
two to ten years ago, Filed more than ten years ago) represent individuals that have filed 
for bankruptcy and the comparison group is never filing for bankruptcy.  Individuals who 
filed for bankruptcy are one to three percent more likely to use food stamps; however, 
after ten years, that probability falls to less than -0.01.  These results suggest that 
individuals who file for bankruptcy are marginally more likely to use food stamps, but 
the magnitude of the effect is small and the results are not statistically significant.  People 
who filed for bankruptcy in the last year are six percentage points less likely to own a 
business, but that effect diminishes to 2 to 0.4 percentage points as time passes. 
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Table III-3: Post Bankruptcy Financial Status 
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Bankruptcy filers are 32 percentage points less likely to own a home when they 
filed for bankruptcy in the past year and while the magnitude of that effect falls over 
time, even ten years after bankruptcy filers are 21 percentage points less likely to own a 
home.  Overall, these results show that individuals filing for bankruptcy are significantly 
less likely to own a home than the average individual in the sample.  However, they are 
no different than other individuals in their state with respect to food stamps and owning a 
business. 
  Next, I run a regression using an indicator for whether someone filed in a state 
with high or low homestead exemptions crossed with the number of years since they 
filed.  The results from this regression are reported in Table III-4.  People who filed for 
bankruptcy in states where individuals have high homestead exemptions are significantly 
less likely to rely on food stamps ten years after filing.  This coefficient is significantly 
different than the corresponding coefficient for states with low homestead exemptions 
where individuals who filed ten years previously are not more or less likely to use food 
stamps.  The results for owning a business are inconclusive from this regression.  While 
filers are less likely to own a business, the differences between the coefficients on high 
and low homestead are not statistically different.    
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Table III-4: Low versus High Exemption States 
 
Food Stamps Own a Business Own Home
Filed within the Past Year 0.0376 -0.0238 -0.166
  x Filed in State with High Exemptions (0.0307) (0.0565) (0.133)
Filed two to ten years ago 0.0268 -0.0307 -0.0583
  x Filed in State with High Exemptions (0.0259) (0.0187) (0.0833)
Filed more than ten years ago -0.0234*** 0.179 0.184*
  x Filed in State with High Exemptions (0.00657) (0.168) (0.0948)
Filed within the Past Year 0.0355 -0.0731*** -0.389***
  x Filed in State with Low Exemptions (0.0383) (0.00768) (0.0875)
Filed two to ten years ago 0.00791 0.0317 -0.192***
  x Filed in State with Low Exemptions (0.0159) (0.0235) (0.0548)
Filed more than ten years ago 0.00410 -0.00817 -0.255***
  x Filed in State with Low Exemptions (0.0154) (0.0270) (0.0421)
Number of Children 0.0246*** 0.00687 0.177***
(0.00492) (0.00590) (0.0208)
Number of Children (Squared) -0.00150 -0.000339 -0.0308***
(0.000981) (0.00181) (0.00493)
Age 0.00153 -0.00331 -0.0622
(0.00458) (0.0117) (0.0393)
Age Squared -0.000114 0.000271 0.00286**
(0.000145) (0.000370) (0.00122)
Head of Household Female 0.0582*** -0.0806*** -0.217***
(0.00946) (0.00860) (0.0209)
Divorced 0.0113 0.00402 -0.150***
(0.00794) (0.0130) (0.0301)
Black 0.0601*** -0.0557*** -0.239***
(0.0144) (0.00650) (0.0288)
Not White or Black 0.0251 -0.0146 -0.114***
(0.0172) (0.0197) (0.0332)
Unemployed in Past Year 0.0305** 0.0263 -0.143***
(0.0148) (0.0195) (0.0254)
High School Graduate -0.0515*** 0.0246* 0.0999***
(0.00824) (0.0129) (0.0214)
College Graduate -0.0501*** 0.0541*** 0.131***
(0.00596) (0.0174) (0.0260)
Graduate School -0.0378*** 0.0866*** 0.0985***
(0.00413) (0.0199) (0.0340)
Number of Observations 8,159 8,160 8,160
NOTES: Table III-4 presents the marginal results from probit regressions on the liklihood of owning a 
home.  Cubic and Quadratic forms of age were also included but not reported, as well as a dummy 
when the race of an individual was missing. The second column includes only states where the 
exemption level for the state is below the median house price.  The third columns includes only states 
where the exemption level for the state is above the median house price.   Standard Errors Clustered 
at the state of residence level and are reported in parentheses below the coefficient.  *** p < 0.01, ** 
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Filers in states with low homestead exemptions are less likely to own a home, 
even 10 years after their filing.  The differences in the coefficients between states with 
high exemptions and low exemptions are significantly different for every year.  These 
results suggest that relative to the average individual in all states, individuals in high 
exemption states are better off after filing for bankruptcy relative to the individuals in low 
exemption states with respect to owning a home.   
As cited earlier in the paper, individuals living in states with high homestead 
exemptions may have a higher demand for owning a home because they will be protected 
from losing their home if they file for bankruptcy.  Creditors in states with high 
exemption laws, however, may be more restrictive in giving out loans.  As a comparison 
group when studying an individual post bankruptcy, I want to use individuals who are 
faced with similar incentives and restrictions on getting a loan.  Therefore, for my next 
set of regressions, I split the sample into individuals residing in states with high 
homestead exemptions versus low homestead exemptions.   
 Table III-5 reports results for all three outcomes split up by the state of residence.  
States with low homestead exemptions are represented in columns one, three, and five 
and states with high homestead exemptions appear in columns two, four, and six. As is 
shown in the first column, filing for bankruptcy in states with low exemptions increases 
the probability of using food stamps, but the magnitude is less than one percentage point 
for all outcomes except in the initial year after filing. Ten years after bankruptcy, 
individuals in states with high exemptions are two percentage points less likely to use 
food stamps, suggesting some improvement by those individuals.  There is no evidence 
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that individuals living in states with low exemptions have continued poor financial 
health.   
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Table III-5: Financial Status Split by State Exemptions 
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Columns three and four examine the likelihood of owning a business.  Individuals are 
seven and three percentage points less likely to own a business if they live in a state with 
low or high homestead exemptions and filed for bankruptcy in the past year.  Individuals 
in states with low homestead exemptions have a positive likelihood of owning a business 
(although not statistically significant) years after filing.  Individuals in high exemption 
states have a lower likelihood of owning a business two to ten years after filing, 
suggesting some evidence of difficulty recovering.   
 Finally, the last two columns report results for the likelihood of owning a home.  
Bankruptcy filers living in states with low exemption laws are 21 to 40 percentage points 
less likely to own a home.  These results suggest a struggle by bankruptcy filers to obtain 
a home even after the bankruptcy flag has been lifted from their credit report after ten 
years of filing.  While filers are 40 percentage points less likely to own a home the year 
after they file, the magnitude of the effect does diminish, again suggesting that some 
people are able to improve, while on average the impact is negative.  Bankruptcy filers in 
states with high homestead exemptions appear to be on par with non-filers in their state 
with no significant coefficients and magnitudes close to zero.   
 
III.6.1 Robustness 
 
 To study my results in a different light, I follow both a difference in difference 
method with the cross-sectional data and run a regression on the change in 
homeownership since the year the individual filed or the year before she filed using the 
panel data.  The results confirm no change in homeownership as time passes since 
bankruptcy, suggesting there is no improvement over time.   
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 Table III-6 reports the results from a difference in difference regression.  The first 
difference is states with high homestead exemptions versus states with low homestead 
exemptions.  The second difference is borrowers who filed for bankruptcy versus 
borrowers who did not file for bankruptcy.  Bankruptcy filers in states with high levels of 
exemptions are more likely to own a home than bankruptcy filers in low asset exemption 
states.  The results show some improvement over time in probability of owning a home, 
however the effect is only on a magnitude of 0.4 percentage points per year and not 
statistically significant.   
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Table III-6: Difference-in-Difference 
 
Dependent Variable: Owning a Home in 1996
Filer -0.158***
(0.0327)
High Exemption State 0.0245
(0.0249)
Filer in High Exemption State 0.130*
(0.0659)
Years Since Filed 0.00457
(0.00276)
Number of Children 0.123***
(0.0114)
Number of Children Squared -0.0204***
(0.00273)
Age -0.0214
(0.0246)
Age Squared 0.00141*
(0.000756)
Head of House Female -0.191***
(0.0131)
Divorced -0.0970***
(0.0162)
Black -0.191***
(0.0176)
Not White or Black -0.120***
(0.0334)
Unemployed in Past Year -0.0852***
(0.0183)
Completed High School 0.109***
(0.0187)
Completed College 0.170***
(0.0237)
Grad School 0.141***
(0.0312)
Missing Education 0.00323
(0.0437)
Constant 0.173
(0.289)
N 8,477
R-sq 0.278
NOTES: Table III-6 presents the results from difference in difference 
regressions on the liklihood of owning a home.  Cubic and Quadratic forms of 
age were also included but not reported, as well as a dummy when the race of 
an individual was missing. Standard errors clustered at the state of residence 
level and are reported in parentheses below the coefficient.  *** p < 0.01, ** p 
< 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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 Table III-7 presents results with the outcome variable being the change in 
homeownership status since the year the borrower filed for bankruptcy.  The results show 
a positive impact on the change in homeownership if the borrower filed in a state with 
low homestead exemptions; however this result is not significant.  Borrowers in states 
with low homestead exemptions are less likely to own a home the more years that pass 
relative to bankruptcy filers in high homestead exemption states.  Borrowers are slightly 
more likely to own a home relative to the year before the borrower filed, but this result is 
not statistically significant and the magnitude is only 3 percentage points and not 
statistically significant.  These results suggest that relative to states with high homestead 
exemptions, bankruptcy filers in states with low homestead exemptions are not more 
likely to buy a home years after bankruptcy.   
 
Table III-7: Change in Homeownership, Low versus High Homestead Exemptions 
 
Low Homestead Exemption 
State 0.0781 0.0781 0.0308 0.0308
(0.0520) (0.0679) (0.0553) (0.0892)
Change in Income 0.00000176*** 0.00000176** 0.00000208*** 0.00000208**
(0.000000306) (0.000000764) (0.000000332) (0.000000857)
Change in Divorce Status -0.299*** -0.299*** -0.110*** -0.110
(0.0286) (0.0818) (0.0319) (0.0735)
Change in Health Limitation 0.0230 0.0230 0.127*** 0.127**
(0.0247) (0.0443) (0.0276) (0.0579)
Years Since Filed 0.0141 0.0141 -0.00249 -0.00249
(0.00897) (0.0185) (0.00942) (0.0172)
Years Since Filed if in Low 
Homestead Exemption State -0.0157* -0.0157 0.00246 0.00246
(0.00948) (0.0195) (0.0100) (0.0185)
Constant -0.0895* -0.0895 -0.0992* -0.0992
(0.0480) (0.0617) (0.0506) (0.0810)
Cluster at Individual No Yes No Yes
N 2,353 2,353 2,216 2,216
R-sq 0.066 0.066 0.033 0.033
Change in Home Ownership Since Year Filed Change in Home Ownership Since Year Before Filed
NOTES: Table III-7 presents the results from an OLS regression with the dependent variable being the change in homeownership status.   
Change in divorce status and health limitation are from the year the borrower filed.  Change in income is from the year the borrower filed 
in columns one and two and from the year before the borrower filed in columns three and four.  Standard Errors are reported in parentheses 
below the coefficient and are clustered at the individual level in columns two and four.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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 Finally, I run a first difference regression with the panel data on the change in 
homeownership.  The results in Table III-8 again reveal that while there might be a 
general increase in homeownership as years since bankruptcy pass, for individuals in 
states with low homestead exemptions this effect is not as strong as for borrowers in 
states with high homestead exemptions (a negative coefficient on Low Exemption State * 
Years Since Filed). 
 
 
Table III-8: First Difference, Low versus High Homestead Exemptions 
 
Change in Income 0.000000593**
(0.000000244)
Change in Health Status 0.0144
(0.0165)
Change in Divorce Status -0.0524**
(0.0253)
Years Since Filed 0.00871**
(0.00348)
Low Exemption State * Years Since Filed -0.00236
(0.00322)
Year Filed 0.00257*
(0.00135)
Constant -5.138*
(2.687)
N 3054
R-sq 0.008
NOTES: Table III-8 reports results from a first differenceing 
regression on the change in homeownership over time for all 
years since an individual filed for bankruptcy.   Standard Errors 
are reported in parentheses below the coefficient and are clustered 
at the individual level in columns two and four.  *** p < 0.01, ** 
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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III.7 Chapter 7 versus Chapter 13 
 
 As mentioned previously, when filing for bankruptcy an individual can choose to 
file either a chapter 7 or a chapter 13 bankruptcy.  In a chapter 7, the filer’s debts are 
liquidated, while in a chapter 13 the borrower sets up a new repayment plan.  Borrowers 
who have homes with values below the exemption level can keep their home by filing a 
chapter 13 rather than a chapter 7.  Individuals filing for a chapter 13, therefore, are likely 
to have higher assets than the chapter 7 borrowers.  Because of the fundamental 
differences between these borrowers, in my next analysis, I control for the chapter under 
which the borrower filed.   
 I perform the same analysis, but only including individuals in states with low 
homestead exemptions.  The results are reported in Table III-9.  Bankruptcy filers who 
filed a chapter 13 in the past year have a higher probability of owning a home by 2.6 
percentage points, but this result is not statistically significant.  Meanwhile, chapter 7 
filers have a statistically significant 55 percentage point lower probability of owning a 
home.  Interestingly, however, borrowers who filed a chapter 13 two to ten years ago and 
more than ten years ago are 23 and 21 percentage points less likely to own a home.  The 
chapter 7 filers are 20 and 31 percentage points less likely to own a home as time passes 
suggesting some improvement from the time they filed.  The difference in the probability 
of owning a home is not statistically different between chapter 7 and chapter 13 filers two 
to ten years out and more than ten years out. The chapter 13 filers seem to be getting 
worse, while there are some signs that the chapter 7 filers are improving.   
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Table III-9: Chapter 7 versus Chapter 13 
 
Own a Home
Filed Ch. 13 within the Past Year 0.0263
(0.111)
Filed Ch. 13 two to ten years ago -0.229***
(0.0859)
Filed Ch. 13 more than ten years ago -0.206***
(0.0703)
Filed Ch. 7 within the Past Year -0.550***
(0.0714)
Filed Ch. 7 two to ten years ago -0.191***
(0.0653)
Filed Ch. 7 more than ten years ago -0.312***
(0.0579)
Number of Children 0.183***
(0.0216)
Number of Children (Squared) -0.0320***
(0.00556)
Age -0.0732**
(0.0335)
Age Squared 0.00332***
(0.00105)
Head of Household Female -0.226***
(0.0233)
Divorced -0.135***
(0.0353)
Black -0.258***
(0.0322)
Not White or Black -0.0938**
(0.0366)
Unemployed in Past Year -0.142***
(0.0281)
High School Graduate 0.108***
(0.0233)
College Graduate 0.151***
(0.0271)
Graduate School 0.0984***
(0.0380)
Number of Observations 6,419
NOTES: Table III-9 presents the results from probit regressions on the liklihood 
of using foodstamps in the past year.  Cubic and Quadratic forms of age were also 
included but not reported, as well as a dummy when the race of an individual was 
missing. The second column includes only states where the exemption level for 
the state is below the median house price.  The third columns includes only states 
where the exemption level for the state is above the median house price.   
Standard Errors Clustered at the state of residence level and are reported in 
parentheses below the coefficient.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Low Homestead Exemption States
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 Using the panel data, I graph the same individuals before and after filing.  As 
shown in Figure III-2, regardless of the decade, individuals who file for chapter 13 
bankruptcy have a decreased probability of owning a home as time passes since 
bankruptcy.  Chapter 7 bankruptcy filers show an improvement in their probability of 
owning a home as time since bankruptcy passes.   
 
 
Figure III-2: Probability of Owning a Home for Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 Bankruptcy 
Filers in States with Low Homestead Exemptions 
 
 
These results support the previous findings that chapter 7 filers are less likely to own a 
home than chapter 13 filers the year that they file.  Chapter 7 filers show some 
improvement, while chapter 13 filers have a decline in their probability over time.   
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 If I include only people in the sample who had owned a home at some point prior 
to filing for bankruptcy, this picture looks the same (Figure III-3) except the probability 
of owning a home is higher for all filers.  There is a general decline in the immediate 
years after filing.  There is an increase in the probability of owning a home for chapter 7 
filers as more years since bankruptcy pass; meanwhile, chapter 13 filers continue to 
decline over time.  
 
 
Figure III-3: Probability of Owning a Home for Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 Bankruptcy 
Filers in States with Low Homestead Exemptions, Conditional on Owning a Home at 
Some Point Prior to Bankruptcy 
 
 
 I then ran a regression on the change in homeownership post bankruptcy.  The 
dependent variable is the change in homeownership from the year that the individual filed 
(Table III-10).  I also run the same regression with the change in homeownership from 
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the year before the individual filed.  Bankruptcy filers may be falling into trouble years 
before they file, so it is not clear what the appropriate comparison group is.  As the 
results show, the more years since filing, the greater the chance that a filer owns a home.  
However, for chapter 13 filers this effect is negative.  As time passes, chapter 13 
bankruptcy filers in states with low homestead exemptions are losing their homes.  These 
results support the graphical results showing that chapter 13 filers are struggling post 
bankruptcy, while there is a slight increase in homeownership for the chapter 7 filers.  
When these results are clustered at the individual level, their statistical significance 
disappears.   
 
Table III-10: Change in Homeownership, Chapter 7 versus Chapter 13 
 
 
 
 
 Finally, I run a first differencing regression looking at the change in 
homeownership over time.  The results shown in Table III-11 are again the same.  While 
Change in Income 0.00000141*** 0.00000141 0.00000218*** 0.00000218**
(0.0000003) (0.000000868) (0.000000368) (0.00000107)
Change in Divorce Status -0.328*** -0.328*** -0.134*** -0.134
(0.031) (0.0912) (0.0346) (0.0838)
Change in Health Limitation Status 0.0258 0.0258 0.142*** 0.142**
(0.027) (0.0489) (0.0302) (0.0671)
Years Since Filed 0.00353 0.00353 0.00582 0.00582
(0.004) (0.00891) (0.00467) (0.00983)
Filed Chapter 13 -0.0107 -0.0107 0.0325 0.0325
(0.007) (0.0120) (0.0470) (0.0720)
Filed Ch. 13 * Years Since Filed -0.00873 -0.00873 -0.0162** -0.0162
(0.043) (0.0553) (0.00754) (0.0145)
Constant -0.00892 -0.00892 -0.0809*** -0.0809
(0.026) (0.0399) (0.0276) (0.0516)
Cluster at Individual No Yes No Yes
N 2,001 2,001 1,859 1,859
R-sq 0.071 0.071 0.043 0.043
Change in Home Ownership Since Year Filed Change in Home Ownership Since Year Before Filed
NOTES: Table III-10 presents the results from an OLS regression with the dependent variable being the change in homeownership status.   
Change in divorce status and health limitation are from the year the borrower filed.  Change in income is from the year the borrower filed in 
columns one and two and from the year before the borrower filed in columns three and four.  Standard Errors are reported in parentheses below 
the coefficient and are clustered at the individual level in columns two and four.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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there is some improvement over time for borrowers likelihood of owning a home for each 
year since filing (a 0.6 percentage point change for each additional year), this variable is 
offset slightly for borrowers who filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy.   
 
 
Table III-11: First Differencing on Homeownership 
 
 
 
 
III.8 Conclusion 
 
 Federal exemption laws are set in the bankruptcy code title 11 section 522(d), but 
individual states can opt out of the federal exemption laws and set their own.  If a state 
Change in Income 0.000000535*
(0.000000275)
Change in Health Status 0.00774
(0.0178)
Change in Divorce Status -0.0617**
(0.0268)
Years Since Filed 0.00600***
(0.00204)
Chapter 13 Filer * Years Since File -0.000548
(0.00167)
Year Filed 0.00225
(0.00137)
Constant -4.500
(2.736)
N 2680
R-sq 0.007
NOTES: Table III-11 reports results from a first differenceing 
regression on the change in homeownership over time for all years 
since an individual filed for bankruptcy.  Only states with low 
homestead exemptions are included in the table.  Standard Errors are 
reported in parentheses below the coefficient and are clustered at the 
individual level in columns two and four.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.1.
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does not opt out, an individual can choose either the federal or state exemption level, 
whichever makes him better off.  Because of this, there is wide variation in the exemption 
laws people face.   
Previous researchers have found that exemption laws affect the number of people 
that file for bankruptcy, individuals’ demand and supply for credit, and the type of person 
(high or low asset) to file for bankruptcy.  Fewer people but higher asset individuals file 
for bankruptcy in states with high homestead exemptions.   
In this paper, I examine whether individuals are able to improve post bankruptcy 
and find that filers are not different than the average individual with respect to the use of 
food stamps and owning a business.  Bankruptcy filers, however, are less likely to own a 
home even 10 years after filing.  This result is driven by people who filed for bankruptcy 
in states with low homestead exemption laws and confirmed using multiple 
specifications.  This paper confirms results that bankruptcy filers living in high 
exemption states have greater assets than those filers in low exemption states, but also 
shows that the lower level of assets continues years after bankruptcy.  This paper expands 
our understanding of how successful individuals are in escaping bankruptcy by taking 
into account the different impact of state exemptions.   
I then split individuals who file in states with low homestead exemptions into two 
groups: those who file for a chapter 7 and those who file a chapter 13.  The probability 
that individuals who file chapter 13 own a home falls as time since bankruptcy passes.  
The probability that individuals that file a chapter 7 own a home increases slightly from 
the year that they filed; however, they still remain below the average individual in terms 
of their likelihood of owning a home.  These results show that bankruptcy filers in states 
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with low homestead exemptions are not able to reach the same homeownership status of 
the average individual in the state and that chapter 13 filers have a lower likelihood of 
owning a home years after filing.   
Further studies are needed to examine why filers in high exemption states are 
different in different decades, and whether that may impact post-filing behavior and 
financial status.  Additionally, a better dataset, possibly through a repeat question in the 
PSID on bankruptcy, will help get more power in understanding the effect for high 
exemption states.   
 While these results show that borrowers in states with low homestead exemptions 
are not able to reach the same level of homeownership as non-bankruptcy filers, it is not 
clear that this result is negative.  Of the sample, only approximately six percent of 
bankruptcy filers in the sample file for a second bankruptcy.  If borrowers are filing 
chapter 13 to keep their home, but then end up losing their home it may be a choice that 
does not necessarily mean that they are any worse off relative to a non-filer.   
 These results are in contrast to other findings that bankruptcy filers catch up to 
non-filers years later.  These results show that borrowers in states with low homestead 
exemptions do not catch up to non-filers and chapter 13 filers household assets decline 
over time.   
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